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Abstract
Part I of this Note will examine two recent actions in the war against international terror-
ism: the Israeli plan to build a separation barrier between Israel and the OPT, and the invasion of
Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom. Part II will discuss two important deviations by
the ICJ from past interpretation of international law that were announced in the advisory proceed-
ings against Israel: a new elucidation by the ICJ regarding principles of judicial propriety and a
new analysis of the abilities of States to act in self-defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.
Part III will address the impact on the international community’s fight against terrorism, and the
role of the ICJ as an international entity.
BUILDING A PROTECTIVE WALL AROUND TERRORISTS
HOW THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE'S
RULING IN THE LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE
CONSTRUCTION OF A WALL IN THE OCCUPIED
PALESTINIAN TERRITORY MADE THE WORLD SAFER FOR
TERRORISTS AND MORE DANGEROUS FOR MEMBER
STATES OF THE UNITED NATIONS
Rebecca Kahan*
INTRODUCTION
The nature of the threats posed to States has changed since
the adoption of the U.N. Charter.1 In recent decades, the inter-
national community has become more aware of the threat posed
by international terrorism. 2 For years, the international commu-
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assistance.
1. See Barry A. Feinstein, A Paradigm for the Analysis of the Legality of the Use of Armed
Force Against Terrorists and States that Aid and Abet them, 17 TRANSNAT'L L. 51, 55, 67-68
(2004) (commenting that international community recognizes that new reality of na-
ture of terrorist organizations requires new thinking in order for States to protect citi-
zens, and concluding that attacks by terrorist group against State constitutes armed
attack because nothing in U.N. Charter states that attacks must be attributed to State
and because Article 51 of U.N. Charter was drafted in broad enough manner to permit
its application to attacks perpetrated by terrorist organizations); see also Matthew Scott
King, The Legality of the United States War on Terror: Is Article 51 a Legitimate Vehicle for the
War in Afghanistan orJust a Blanket to Cover-Up International War Crimes?, 9 ILSAJ. IN'r'L &
COMp. L. 457, 471 (2003) (noting that modern threats of warfare require that interpre-
tations of Article 51 of U.N. Charter include acts of international terrorism, particularly
to prevent States from supporting acts of terrorism to wage war against their enemies);
Michael N. Schmitt, U.S. Security Strategies: A Legal Assessment, 27 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
737, 761-62 (2004) (concluding that in 21st Century international community has come
to accept use of force against non-State actors so long as all requirements of self-defense
have been met and arguing that acceptance of Operation Enduring Freedom by inter-
national community demonstrates appreciation of emergence of new international ter-
rorism and that American strategy is consistent with this shift) [hereinafter Schmitt,
Assessment]; Carsten Stahn, Terrorist Attacks as "Armed Attack": The Right to Self-Defense,
Article 51 (1/2) of the UN Charter, and International Terrorism, 27-FALL FLETCHER F. WORLD
Aei. 35, 35-36 (2003) (commenting that drafters of U.N. Charter left concept of armed
attack open to interpretation of Member States).
2. SeeJaume Saura, Some Remarks on the Use of Force Against Terrorism in Contemporary
International Law, 26 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMp. L. REV. 7, 8 (2003) (noting that interna-
tional community has become more aware of threat posed by terrorism since 1960s); see
also Maj'r Joshua E. Kastenberg, The Use of Conventional International Law in Combating
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nity has embraced the idea that targeting civilians violates princi-
ples of international law; however, terrorist organizations have
adopted this strategy as part of their policy.' In order to protect
its citizens, States need to adapt their security policies to the new
threats, and the new adversaries they face.4 Many terrorist
groups, particularly religious-based groups, no longer rely on
State sponsorship.5 Scholars of terrorism conclude that many
militant Islamic groups are moving toward complete indepen-
dence.6
Terrorism: A Maginot Line for Modern Civilization Employing Principles of Anticipatory Self-
Defense & Preemption, 55 A.F. L. REv. 87, 105 (2004) (concluding that while international
law regarding use of force was originally designed to regulate interstate warfare in order
to protect civilians from atrocities of war, law should be applied to terrorist attacks as
well because such acts should not be tolerated when there is existing framework to
review illegal acts); Daniel Philpott, Religious Freedom and the Undoing of the Westphalian
State, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 981, 982 (2004) (explaining that religion is important in
international politics and that non-State actors cause conflicts that take heaviest toll on
sovereign States); Leila Nadya Sadat, Terrorism and the Rule of Law, 3 WASH. U. GLOBAL
STUD. L. REv. 135, 139 (2004) (stating that international leaders believe that threat of
international terrorism will grow in future).
3. See Kastenberg, supra note 2, at 100, 105 (noting that one distinctive difference
between legitimate use of military force and terrorist activity is willingness of terrorists
to carry out acts of violence against civilians, and concluding that terrorist organizations
violate principles of international law that other States are forced to abide by, including
principle that civilians should not be targeted during military operations); see also Fein-
stein, supra note 1, at 55 (explaining that terrorists demonstrate disregard for interna-
tional law and moral codes while hiding behind rules and codes that prevent other
international actors from protecting themselves).
4. See Schmitt, Assessment, "upra note 1, at 754 (explaining that for centuries, inter-
national law has recognized that States should not be forced to suffer attack to act in
self-defense and that in order for States to create policy to prevent those threats they
must be able to adapt concept of threat in face of types of weapons new adversaries
use); see also Kastenberg, supra note 2, at 105 (concluding that international laws of war
were designed to regulate interstate warfare and terrorist acts were intended to circum-
vent those norms and that international legal norms that already exist should be
adapted to bear upon new acts); Feinstein, supra note 1, at 55 (explaining that new
reality of terrorism requires that existing framework of law be adapted in manner capa-
ble of incorporating new threats posed by international terrorism and access to weap-
ons of mass destruction).
5. See Kastenberg, supra note 2, at 100-01 (explaining that many modem terrorist
groups do not depend on support from States, particularly those that are religious-
based); see also Josh Kastenberg, The Customary International Law of War and Combatant
Status: Does the Current Executive Branch Policy on Determination on Unlawful Combatant
Status for Terrorists Run Afoul of International Law, or is it Just Poor Public Relations?, 39
GONz. L. REv. 495, 510-11 (2003-2004) (concluding that many terrorist organizations
have moved away from direct State-sponsorship).
6. See Kastenberg, supra note 2, at 102 (arguing that many scholars conclude that
fundamentalist Islamic groups are becoming less reliant on State support, potentially
allowing them to pursue more violent acts). See generally Edgardo Rotman, The Globaliza-
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The United Nations has taken action to draw attention to
the threats posed by international terrorism and to enact mea-
sures designed to suppress the capabilities of terrorist organiza-
tions.7 In 1994, the General Assembly adopted the Declaration
on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism which stated
that the General Assembly was determined to eliminate interna-
tional terrorism of all types." In 1999, the Security Council
passed Resolution 1269 which condemned all acts of terrorism,
regardless of their origin, and stated that they pose a threat to
international peace and security.9 Furthermore, in 2001, the Se-
curity Council issued Resolutions 1368 and 1373 condemning all
acts of international terrorism, reiterating the need for States to
prevent and suppress acts of international terrorism, affirming
that it is illegal to assist, finance, or harbor terrorist organiza-
tions, and creating a subsidiary body of the Security Council to
tion of Criminal Violence, 10 CORNELLJ. L. & PUB. POL'Y 21 (2000) (arguing that increased
globalization has allowed international actors to obtain more deadly weapons and
orchestrate more massive attacks).
7. See S.C. Res. 1269, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4053rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1269
(1999) (encouraging Members to take action against international terrorists); see also,
S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4370th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (2001)
(condemning attacks that occurred on September l1th, 2001 ("September l1th at-
tacks") against United States and calling on international community to fight against
international terrorism); S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4385th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1373 (2001) (affirming right of self-defense and creating subsidiary body to
monitor progress in fight against terrorism); Declaration on Measures to Eliminate Interna-
tional Terrorism, G.A. Res. 49/60, U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 49th Sess., 84th plen. mtg.,
U.N. Doc. A/49/60 (1994) (finding that acts designed to instigate terror in public are
unjustifiable and calling on States to refrain from participating in any way in organiza-
tion of such acts); Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, G.A.
Res. 51/210, U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 51st Sess., 88th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. Res/51/210
(1996) (affirming position of General Assembly taken in Resolution 49/60).
8. See G.A. Res. 49/60, supra note 7 (declaring that General Assembly was dedi-
cated to eradicating all acts of international terrorism); see also Feinstein, supra note 1,
at 62-63 (noting that General Assembly adopted Resolution 49/60 which adopted Dec-
laration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism in which General Assembly
stated that acts of international terrorism threaten security of all States); Saura, supra
note 2, at 13 (stating that General Assembly has indicated willingness to address threats
posed by international terrorists, position it adopted in Resolutions 46/90 and 51/210).
9. See S.C. Res. 1269, supra note 7 (condemning acts of international terrorism and
stating that they pose threat to international peace and security); see also Feinstein, supra
note 1, at 64 (noting that Security Council passed Resolution 1269 because of concern
that acts of international terrorism affect peace and security of all States); Saura, supra
note 2, at 16 (explaining that Security Council Resolution 1269 viewed international
terrorism as new threat to peace and security, but that resolution was adopted without
specific reference to any case).
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monitor the implementation of Resolution 1373.10
Recently, both Israel and the United States have imple-
mented plans designed to end a series of attacks against their
citizens by international terrorists." Israel planned to build a
separation barrier between its territory and the Occupied Pales-
tinian Territory ("OPT") as an effort to decrease the number of
cross Green-Line attacks. 12 The United States began Operation
Enduring Freedom following the attacks on September l1th,
2001, ("September 11th attacks") in response to a series of
strikes against military and civilian targets by the al Qaeda terror-
ist organization.13
10. See S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 7 (expressing sympathy for victims of September
11 th attacks, affirming right to self-defense and Resolution 1269, and calling on States
to fight international terrorism); see also S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 7 (affirming Resolu-
tion 1269, right to self-defense, threat posed by international terrorism, and calling on
States to take all action necessary to fight international terrorism, and creating subsidi-
ary body of United Nations charged with duty to oversee actions taken to suppress inter-
national terrorism).
11. See Report of the Secretary General prepared pursuant to General Assembly Resolution
ES-I0/13, U.N. GAOR, 10th Emergency Special Sess., Ann. I, 4-5, U.N. Doc A/ES-
10/248 (2003) [hereinafter Report Prepared Pursuant to FS-10/13] (reporting that govern-
ment of Israel had considered plans to stop infiltration into Israel and approved first
phase of construction of separation barrier in 2002); see also Letter from John D. Negro-
ponte, Permanent Representative of the United States, to the President of the Security
Council (Oct. 7, 2001), U.N. Doc. S/2001/946, available at http://www.un.int/usa/s-
2001-946.htm (stating that Operation Enduring Freedom was launched in self-defense
against terrorist acts and that United States did not seek approval of United Nations for
this reason).
12. See Report Prepared Pursuant to ES-l0/13, supra note 11, Ann. I, 4-5 (observing
that government of Israel approved first phase of construction of separation barrier in
2002 as method to prevent infiltration into Israel); see also Nicole Trudeau, ICJ to Give an
Advisory Opinion Regarding Israel's Barrier, 11 (2) HUM. RTs. B. 34, (2004) (noting that
Israeli government approved plan after steady increase in terrorist attacks); Anti-Defa-
mation League, Decision Dismisses Israel's Arguments, Accepts Palestinian Claims
Without Reservation, July 9, 2004, available at http://www.adl.org/Israel?court-of jus-
tice.asp (describing separation barrier as security measure implemented to prevent ter-
rorists from reaching targets inside Israel) [hereinafter Decision Dismisses Israel's Argu-
ments]; Aaron Klein, Hague-wash: Court of "Justice" Ruling aJoke!,July 14, 2004, avail-
able at http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLEID=39439 (noting
that terrorists blame separation barrier for their inability to carry out attacks).
13. See King, supra note 1, at 463 (explaining that September 11th attacks were not
isolated incident, but were part of series of attacks by al Qaeda against United States);
see alsoJordan J. Paust, Use of Armed Force Against Terrorists in Afghanistan, Iraq and Beyond,
35 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 533, 533 (2002) (listing attacks against U.S.S. Cole, U.S. embas-
sies in Kenya and Tanzania, and World Trade Center as some in series of terrorist at-
tacks perpetrated by al Queda against United States); Saura, supra note 2, at 14 (noting
that Taliban Government and al Qaeda were accused of orchestrating bombings of U.S.
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania).
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The international community criticized Israel's decision to
build the separation barrier.14 The General Assembly asked the
International Court ofJustice ("ICJ") to render an advisory opin-
ion regarding the consequences of the construction of the seg-
ments of the separation barrier that crossed the internationally
accepted boundary between Israel and the OPT.15 On July 9,
2004, the ICJ issued an advisory opinion in Legal Consequences of
the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (" Con-
struction of a Wall Case").16 In its lengthy opinion, the ICJ ad-
dressed many relevant principles of international law, including
14. See Illegal Israeli Actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the Rest of the Occupied Pales-
tinian Territory, U.N. GAOR, 10th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/ES-10/13 (2003) (condemn-
ing construction of separation barrier and demanding that Israel cease and reverse its
construction); see also Press Release, General Assembly Adopts Text Requesting Interna-
tional Court of Justice to Issue Advisory Opinion on West Bank Separation Wall, U.N.
Doc. GA/10216 (Dec. 8, 2003), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/
2003/gal0216.doc.htm [hereinafter Press Release 10216] (giving statements of those
who voted in favor of request for advisory opinion); Press Release, International Meet-
ing on Impact of Wall Built by Israel in Occupied Palestinian Territory, U.N. Doc. GA/
PAL/953, (Apr. 16, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/
gapal953.doc.htm (noting concern of participants of International Meeting on Impact
of Wall Built by Israel in Occupied Palestinian Territory ("OPT") regarding potential
humanitarian impact of separation barrier) [hereinafter GA/PAL/953].
15. See Illegal Israeli Actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the Rest of the Occupied Pales-
tinian Territory, U.N. GAOR, 10th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/ES-10/14 (2003) [hereinafter
ES-10/14] (stating that General Assembly is gravely concerned with construction of seg-
ments of separation barrier that depart from Green Line and requesting that ICJ
render advisory opinion regarding legal consequences of separation barrier being built
by Israel); see also Press Release 2003/42, The General Assembly of the United Nations
Requests an Advisory Opinion from the Court on the Legal Consequences Arising from
the Construction by Israel of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, (Dec. 10,
2003), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ipresscom/ipress2003/ipresscom2003-
42_xx_20031210.htm [hereinafter Press Release 2003/42] (noting receipt by ICJ of
General Assembly's request); Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, 43 I.L.M. 1009, 1011-12, 1029, 1 1, 67 (July 9, 2004)
[hereinafter Construction of a Wall Case] (noting that question to which case responded
was set out in General Assembly Resolution ES-10/14 and that because request con-
cerned legal consequences of separation barrier being built in OPT, it would only ad-
dress those portions of separation barrier); Summary of the Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004,
International Court of Justice Summary 2004/2 (July 9, 2004) available at http://www.
icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imwp/imwpframe.htm [hereinafter Summary of Advisory
Opinion] (noting that ICJ determined that scope of its jurisdiction only covered por-
tions of separation barrier that crossed Green Line and were thus outside of Israel).
16. See Construction of a Wall Case, 43 I.L.M. at 1054-56, 163 (finding separation
barrier illegal and finding that Israel must stop construction); see also Press Release
2004/28, The Court finds that the Construction by Israel of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory and its Associated Regime are Contrary to International Law, (July
9, 2004) [hereinafter Press Release 2004/28] (summarizing findings of ICJ).
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those of judicial propriety. 17 By finding no reason to exercise
discretion, the ICJ departed from past interpretations of the duty
to exercise discretion when giving an advisory opinion. 8 The
Construction of a Wall Case, however, failed to recognize the secur-
ity threat posed by terrorists that are not associated with a
State.19 By omitting such a discussion, the ICJ called into ques-
tion what had been considered legitimate security policies of
many States, particularly of the United States in Operation En-
during Freedom. 21 While neither Operation Enduring Free-
17. See Construction of a Wall Case, 43 I.L.M. at 1016-29, 7 13-65 (noting that ICJ
addressed jurisdiction first); see also Summary of Advisory Opinion, supra note 15 (noting
that jurisdiction issues spanned Paragraphs 13-65 of Opinion).
18. See Construction of a Wall Case, 43 I.L.M. at 1016-29, 13-65 (discussing rele-
vant principles ofjudicial propriety but noting that none applied to case at bar); see also
Fr. RobertJ. Araujo, S.J., Implementation of the ICJAdvisory Opinion - - Legal Consequences of
the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory: Fences [Do Not] Make Good
Neighbors?, 22 B.U. INT'L L.J. 349, 361 (2004) (questioning whether decision to grant
advisory opinion was abuse of judicial discretion); Joshua Rozenberg, UN Judges are
Urged to Sit on the Fence Britain and America say the International Court of Justice Should
Decline to Give an Opinion on the Legitimacy of Israel's 400-mile Barrier, DAILY TELEGRAPH,
Feb. 12, 2004, available at 2004 WL 68217170 (explaining that United States and United
Kingdom find that ICJ had previously determined several situations in which it is inap-
propriate to give advisory opinion, that all were present in Construction of a Wall Case,
and that ICJ decided to grant request for advisory opinion even though it violated prin-
ciples that ICJ had previously articulated).
19. See Construction of a Wall Case, 43 I.L.M. at 1063-64, 7 33-34 (separate opinion
of Higgins, J.) (noting reservations regarding ICJ's interpretation of applicability of Ar-
ticle 51 of U.N. Charter); see also id. at 1097, 27 (separate opinion of Owada, J.)
(noting importance of considering separation barrier as part of situation in Middle-East
with long history); id. at 1078-79, 7 3, 5 (declaration of Buergenthal, J.) (stating that
Israel's security concerns were never addressed and noting importance of addressing
separation barrier in context of deadly attacks that have occurred against citizens of
Israel); id. at 1068, 1 12 (separate opinion of Kooijmans, J.) (observing that ICJ never
put protections potentially afforded by separation barrier in context of dispute and that
ICJ stated importance of regarding context of dispute as whole but never did it); Israel
Must Ignore the ICJ, NAT'L POST, July 10, 2004, available at 2004 WL 85151438 [hereinaf-
ter National Post] (concluding that word "terrorism" never appears in opinion in Con-
struction of a Wall Case); What the Court Advisory Opinion Does and Does Not Say, Jul. 23,
2004, available at http://www.adl.org/Israel/court-of-justice-analysis.asp [hereinafter
What the Court Advisory Opinion Does and Does not Say] (noting that ICJ did not address
defensive role of barrier); Steven Lubet, Lack of Regard Shown for Israel's Concerns, CHIC.
TRIB., July 13, 2004, available at 2004 WL 86077711 (finding that treatment of security
issue was dismissive and that ICJ never put protections afforded by separation barrier in
context of larger, ongoing dispute); Dan Ephron, World Court Rules Israeli Barrier Illegal
BOSTON GLOBE, July 10, 2004 (remarking that even opponents of separation barrier
believed issue was not addressed appropriately).
20. See Lubet, supra note 19 (noting that logic of ICJ in Construction of a Wall Case
would indicate that United States would not be justified in acting against al Qaeda, but
such action was permitted by Security Council in Resolutions 1368 and 1373); see also A
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dom, nor any other action during the war on terrorism has been
challenged, the combination of this discussion and omission
raises many issues for all States regarding their ability to create
national security policies against terrorism without fear of falling
within ICJ jurisdiction.2 '
Part I of this Note will examine two recent actions in the war
against international terrorism: the Israeli plan to build a sepa-
ration barrier between Israel and the OPT, and the invasion of
Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom. Part II will
discuss two important deviations by the ICJ from past interpreta-
tion of international law that were announced in the advisory
proceedings against Israel: a new elucidation by the ICJ regard-
ing principles ofjudicial propriety and a new analysis of the abili-
ties of States to act in self-defense under Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter. Part III will address the impact on the international
community's fight against terrorism, and the role of the ICJ as
an international entity.
I. FIGHTING THE INTERNATIONAL WAR ON TERRORISM:
THE RIGHT TO SELF-DEFENSE
The U.N. Charter mandates that States refrain from the use
or threat of force against other States in their international rela-
New U.N. Assault on Israel, WALL ST. J. EUR., July 12, 2004, available at 2004 WL-WJSE
56869961 [hereinafter New U.N. Assault] (stating that opinion in Construction of a Wall
Case had potential to challenge justifications used by United States in entering war on
terror).
21. See Decision Dismisses Israel's Arguments, supra note 12 (last visited March 15,
2005) (noting that opinion in Construction of a Wall Case may provide precedent for ICJ
to bring sovereign States before ICJ and force State to defend policy before ICJ); see also
Ruth Wedgewood, Ill-Advised Advisory, AsIAN W. ST. J., Feb. 19, 2004, available at 1004
WL-WSJA 56590771 (positing that to allow ICJ to intrude into policy matters of States
will affect international community's perception of different conflicts); Andrew C. Mc-
Carthy, The End of the Right of Self-defense? Israel, the World Court, and the War on Terror,
COMMENT., Nov. 1, 2004, at 17, available at 2004 WL 62917018 (arguing that decision to
hear case potentially undermines integrity of ICJ and integrity of international law, and
stating that decision changes role of ICJ because ICJ allows liberal submissions by non-
parties during advisory proceedings, allowing all nations to become involved in address-
ing policy determinations of other States); Ruth Wedgewood, White Paper on the Interna-
tional Court of Justice and the Israeli "Fence": The General Assembly Referal on "Legal Conse-
quence of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Feb. 23, 2004, avail-
able at http://defenddemocracy.org/publications/publicationsshow.htm?doc-id=
212024 [hereinafter Comments on White Paper] (explaining that allowing ICJ to be-
come involved in such matters, United Nations engages entire international community
because in advisory proceedings submissions are allowed by non-parties).
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tions.2 2 Article 51, however, provides an exception to this limita-
* 23 tation. It proclaims that nothing in the U.N. Charter will impair
the inherent right of States to act in individual or collective self-
defense. 24 This article of the U.N. Charter enumerates certain
requirements that States must meet when acting in self-defense,
including that a State must be acting in response to an armed
attack, must report its actions to the Security Council, and the
use of force must not impair the ability of the Security Council
to restore international peace and security. 25
A. Two Recent Policy Decisions Regarding the War on Terrorism
Two recent responses to the war against terror have come
from different parts of the world: Israel during the al Aqsa In-
tifada; and the United States against al Qaeda. 26 Although the
22. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 4 (stating that all Members will refrain from use of
force in international relations); see alsoJudgment of Nov. 6, 2003, Oil Platforms (Iran
v. U.S.), 43, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iop/iopjudgment/
iop ijudgment_20031106.PDF (noting that ICJ would have to analyze right to self-de-
fense within confines of prohibition against use of force) [hereinafter Oil Platforms
Case]; King, supra note 1, at 459 (stating that Article 2(4) of U.N. Charter mandates that
States refrain from use of force when settling international disputes).
23. See U.N. CHARTER art. 51 (providing that States may use force in act of self-
defense); see also King, supra note 1, at 459-60 (noting that framers of U.N. Charter
recognized long-established right to self-defense and provided that States could use self-
defense to protect their citizens).
24. See U.N. CHARTER art. 51 (stating that nothing in U.N. Charter shall prevent
States from exercising right to self-defense); see also King, supra note 1, at 460 (conclud-
ing that framers of U.N. Charter provided exception to general prohibition against use
of force and stated that nothing in the Charter would hamper inherent right of State to
act in individual or collective self-defense).
25. See U.N. CHARTER art. 51 (requiring that for action in self-defense to be valid, it
must be in response to armed attack, must be reported to Security Council, and must
not affect Security Council's efforts to maintain international peace and security); see
also Schmitt, Assessment, supra note 1, at 750-51 (explaining that for State to act under
Article 51 of U.N. Charter it must have been victim of armed attack and must report its
actions to Security Council, although does not have to seek approval of Security Coun-
cil); Michael J. Glennon, The Fog of Law: Self-Defense, Inherence, and Incoherence in Article
51 of the United Nations Charter, 25 HARv.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 539, 553-54 (2002) (observing
that State is only permitted to act in self-defense under Article 51 of U.N. Charter if its
actions do not impair ability of Security Council to maintain international peace and
security).
26. See Report Prepared Pursuant to ES-I0/13, supra note 11, Ann. I 4-5 (reporting
that government of Israel had considered plans to cease infiltration into Israel and
approved first phase of construction of separation barrier in 2002); see also Letter from
John D. Negroponte, supra note 11 (stating that Operation Enduring Freedom was
launched in self-defense against terrorist acts and United States did not seek approval
of United Nations for this reason).
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terrorist organizations were different, the acts of terror were very
similar: they were aimed at destroying the lives of innocent civil-
ians.27 Furthermore, the origin of the attacks was similar: they
can be attributed to religious based organizations whose leaders
are not part of any State's government. 2 Both Nations claim to
have acted in self-defense in an effort to protect their citizens. 29
1. The Israeli Separation Barrier
Many of the cross-border attacks have been attributed to a
terrorist organization known as Hamas. ° In 1987, a group of
Palestinians living in the area controlled by Israel after the Six-
Day War began a series of attacks known as the Intifada.3 1 Al-
though there was a period of peace, the second Intifada, the al
27. See Sara Roy, Religious Nationalism and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict: Examining
Hamas and the Possibility of Reform, 5 CHI.J. INT'L L. 251, 251 (2004) (stating that terrorist
organization Hamas perpetrated many suicide bombings against Israeli citizens at start
of al Aqsa Intifada); see also Sadat, supra note 2, at 139 (stating that as part of Operation
Enduring Freedom, United States has taken action to help deter and prevent attacks by
taking measures against al Qaeda); Kastenberg, supra note 2, at 104 (noting that Hamas
charter instructs members to kill non-believers who rule over Muslims); Philpott, supra
note 2, at 987 (stating that September 11 th attacks were carried out by Islamic revivalists
who have commenced jihad, or religious war, against United States); Feinstein, supra
note 1, at 55 (explaining that terrorists demonstrate disregard for international law and
for moral codes while hiding behind rules and codes that prevent other international
actors from protecting themselves).
28. See Philpott, supra note 2, at 988 (stating that al Qaeda is non-State affiliated
terrorist organization that organizes jihad for global Islamic community); see also Amitai
Etzioni, Hamas, available at http://www.mideastweb.org/hamas.htm (explaining that
Hamas formed separately from Palestinian Liberation Organization ("PLO') and was
organized to carry out attacks against Israelis) (last visited Mar. 15, 2005).
29. See Report Prepared Pursuant to ES-10/13, supra note 11, Ann. I, 4-5 (re-
porting that government of Israel had considered plans to cease infiltration into Israel
and approved first phase of construction of separation barrier in 2002); see also Letter
from John D. Negroponte, supra note 11 (stating that Operation Enduring Freedom
was launched in self-defense against terrorist acts and did not seek approval of United
Nations for this reason).
30. See Roy, supra note 27, at 259 (noting that Hamas was involved in attacks dur-
ing alA qsa Intifada); see alsoJohn Alan Cohan, Formulation of a State's Response to Terrorism
and State-Sponsored Terrorism, 14 PACE INT'L L. REv. 77, 83-84 (2002) (noting that suicide
bombings have been used in conflict between Israel and Palestine and that when
Hamas uses such tactics it is regarded under international norms as act of terrorism)
[hereinafter Cohan, Formulation].
31. See Hamas, supra note 28 (explaining that Hamas formed separately from PLO
and was organized to carry out attacks against Israelis); see also Russell Korobkin &
Johnathan Zasloff, Roadblocks to the Roadmap: A Negotiation Theory Perspective on the on the
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict after Yassar Arafat, 30 YALE J. INT'L L 1, 29 (2005) (stating that
Hamas and PLO are different organizations); Karina Sandberg, A Horse is a Horse, of
Course? Israel and the United Nations' Conference on Racism, 12 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP.
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Aqsa Intifada, began in September 2000.32 The Charter of
Hamas contains a commandment that supports killing all non-
believers who govern Muslims regardless of their political affilia-
tion, and to liberate the holy land controlled by Israel.33
The Palestinian Liberation Organization ("PLO") has also
participated in the al Aqsa Intifada and is responsible for many of
the attacks against Israeli citizens.34 The PLO was created in
1964 with support from Egypt, but eventually Yassar Arafat as-
sumed leadership.35 The United Nations has granted the PLO
observer status as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian
people, but they are not officially recognized as a State. 6
The Israeli government decided on April 14, 2002, to build
a system of barriers, ditches, fences, and walls 7 in response to
PROBS. 245, 251 (2002) (noting that immediately following Six-Day War, Palestinians
launched series of attacks known as Intifada).
32. See Korobkin & Zasloff, supra note 31, at 3 (noting that second intifada began
in September 2000 reinstating a war between Israel and Palestine); see also Roy, supra
note 27, at 251 (stating that Hamas perpetrated many suicide bombings against Israeli
citizens at start of al Aqsa Intifada).
33. See The Covenant on the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) (Aug. 18,
1998), available at http://www.mideastweb.org/hamas.htm (stating as one of its mis-
sions the creation ofjihad, or holy war, to gain control of holy land from Israel); see also
Kastenberg, supra note 2, at 104 (noting that Hamas charter instructs members to kill
non-believers who rule over Muslims); Roy, supra note 27, at 252-53 (explaining that
Hamas is Islam based political organization whose influence has evolved through use of
force against Israelis)
34. See Roy, supra note 27, at 252 (noting that PLO participated in al Aqsa Intifada);
see also Frances Raday, Self-Determination and Minority Rights, 26 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 453,
473 (2003) (explaining that militant wing of PLO has been held responsible for many
of attacks that were part of al Aqsa Intifada).
35. See Amitai Etzioni, Palestinian Organizations, available at http://www.
mideastweb.org/palestianparties.htm#PLO (stating that PLO was established by Egypt
but was taken over by Yassar Arafat) (last visited Mar. 15, 2005); see also Kyle C. Olive,
Finding Common Ground, the Missing Pieces of Middle East Peace, 2 SEAtrLEJ. Soc. JusT. 415,
417 (2004) (observing that PLO was formed as umbrella group for various guerilla cam-
paigns organized by Israel's Arab neighbors and was taken over by Yassir Arafat after
Six-Day War).
36. See Palestinian Organizations, supra note 35 (noting that United Nations granted
PLO observer status); see also Construction of a Wall Case, 43 I.L.M. 1009, 1054-56, 4
(July 9, 2004) (observing that General Assembly granted PLO observer status during
proceedings that led to adoption of request for advisory opinion in Construction of a Wall
Case).
37. See Dossier: Materials Compiled Pursuant to Article 65, paragraph 2, of the Statute of
the International Court of Justice (Request for Advisory Opinion by the International Court of
Justice Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution A/ES-1 0/14), 3 (Jan. 19, 2004), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imwp/imwpframe.htm [hereinafter Dossier]
(stating that Israel decided to build barrier in April 2002); see also Trudeau, supra note
12 (noting that increased number of attacks by Palestinian terrorists during Spring of
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the numerous cross Green-Line attacks against Israeli citizens.3 8
Originally, the plan for the separation barrier ran along the
Green Line," which the international community has come to
accept as Israel's border with the OPT.4 0 The Israeli Cabinet,
however, voted in October 2003 to expand the project.41 These
extended portions of the barrier deviated from the path of the
Green Line, and resulted in surrounding roughly 15% of the
West Bank to protect enclaves of Israeli settlements.
42
The international community criticized the decision to
2002 led to Israel's approval of construction of 80 kilometers of Barrier in three por-
tions of West Bank ); Press Release 10216, supra note 14 (noting that Secretary General
recognized right and duty of Israel to protect citizens from terror attacks and that sepa-
ration barrier was built in response to terror attacks that originated in Palestine); Report
Prepared Pursuant to ES-JO/13, supra note 11, 1 5 (noting that Israeli Government de-
cided to build separation barrier to prevent infiltration of terrorists).
38. See Trudeau, supra note 12 (noting that Israeli government approved plan after
steady increase in terrorist attacks); see also Report Prepared Pursuant to ES-JO/13, supra
note 11, ann. I 4-5 (reporting that government of Israel had considered plans to
cease infiltration into Israel and approved first phase of construction of separation bar-
rier in 2002); Decision Dismisses Israel's Arguments, supra note 12 (describing separation
barrier as security measure implemented to prevent terrorists from reaching targets
inside Israel); Klein, supra note 12 (noting that terrorists blame separation barrier for
their inability to carry out attacks).
39. SeeTrudeau, supra note 12 (noting that original plan followed Green Line); see
also ICJ Advisory Opinion on Israeli Security Fence, 98 AM.J. INT'L L. 361, 361 (2004) (Sean
D. Murphy, ed.) (noting that in Spring of 2002, government of Israel began construc-
tion of security barrier along Green Line) [hereinafter ICJ Advisory Opinion on Israeli
Security Fence].
40. See Trudeau, supra note 12 (noting that international community recognizes
Green Line as Israel's border); see also Christian Hauswaldt, Problems Under the EC -
Israel Association Agreement: The Export of Goods Produced in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
Under the EC - Israel Association Agreement, 14 EUR. J. INT'L LAw 591, 600 (2003) (noting
that Green Line is recognized by most States as Israel's border).
41. See Report Prepared Pursuant to ES-JO/13, supra note 11, 1 6 (noting that Israeli
cabinet voted to expand project); see also Trudeau, supra note 12 (noting that on Octo-
ber 23, 2003, government of Israel approved portion of route that would deviate from
Green Line); Amiai Etzioni, Israel's Security Barrier Could Use Tweaking, Not a Wrecking
Ball, USA TODAY, Aug. 4, 2004, available at 2004 WL 58561681 (noting that only 15% of
barrier's path would have to be shifted in order for path to follow Green Line) [herein-
after Etzioni, Tweaking]; ICJ Advisory Opinion on Israeli Security Fence, supra note 39, at 361
(noting that path of separation barrier was extended on October 23, 2003 to encompass
portions of West Bank).
42. See Report Prepared Pursuant to ES-I0/13, supra note 11, 8 (stating that 975
square kilometers, or 16.6% of West Bank would lie between separation barrier and
Green Line, an area that is home to approximately 17,000 Palestinians in West Bank
and 220,000 in EastJerusalem); see also ICJAdvisory Opinion on Israeli Security Fence, supra
note 39, at 361 (noting that extension would intrude into approximately 15% of West
Bank); Etzioni, Tweaking, supra note 41 (noting that only 15% of barrier's path would
have to be shifted in order for path to follow Green Line).
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build the separation barrier.4" The U.N. General Assembly con-
demned the separation barrier and requested that Israel cease
construction.44 Furthermore, it requested that the ICJ issue an
advisory opinion regarding the consequences of the separation
barrier.4" The request for an opinion only involved those por-
tions of the separation barrier that deviated from the Green
Line.4 6 The ICJ rendered its opinion regarding the legal conse-
quences of the construction of the separation barrier in the OPT
on July 9, 2004.4 7
Israel contended that it built the separation barrier in light
of the right to self-defense provided for in the U.N. Charter.48
43. See G.A. Res. ES-10/13, supra note 14 (condemning construction of separation
barrier and demanding that Israel cease and reverse its construction); see also Press
Release 10216, supra note 37 (giving statements of those who voted in favor of request
for Advisory Opinion); GA/PAL/953, supra note 14 (noting concern of participants of
International Meeting on Impact of Wall Built by Israel in OPT regarding potential
humanitarian impact of separation barrier).
44. See G.A. Res. ES-10/13, supra note 14, 7 1, 3 (demanding that Israel cease
construction and tear down portions that had been completed and requesting that Sec-
retary General write report on Israel's compliance); see also Construction of a Wall Case, 43
I.L.M. 1009, 1018, 21 (July 9, 2004) (noting that General Assembly adopted Resolu-
tion ES-10/13 which demanded that Israel cease construction and requested report on
compliance); Report Prepared Pursuant to ES-I 0/13, supra note 11 (remarking that Gen-
eral Assembly requested report in ES-10/13 in which General Assembly condemned
construction of separation barrier).
45. See G.A. Res. ES 10/14, supra note 15 (requesting that ICJ render advisory opin-
ion regarding legal consequences of separation barrier being built by Israel); see also
Construction of a Wall Case, 43 I.L.M. at 1009, 1 (stating that question to which advisory
opinion responded in Construction of a Wall Case was set out in ES-10/14); Press Release
2003/42, supra note 15 (noting receipt by the ICJ of the General Assembly's request).
46. See G.A. Res. ES 10/14, supra note 15 (stating that General Assembly is gravely
concerned with construction of separation barrier in areas that depart from Green
Line); see also Construction of a Wall Case, 43 I.L.M. at 1029, 67 (noting that because
request concerns legal consequences of separation barrier being built in OPT, ICJ will
only address those portions of separation barrier); Summary of Advisory Opinion, supra
note 15 (observing that ICJ determined that scope of its jurisdiction only covered por-
tions of separation barrier that crossed Green Line and were thus outside of Israel).
47. See Construction of a Wall Case, 43 I.L.M. 1009, (July 9, 2004) (giving advisory
opinion of ICJ); see also Court Will Render its Advisory Opinion on Friday 9July 2004, at 3
p.m., International Court of Justice Press Release 2004/23 (June 25, 2004) available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imwp/imwpframe.htm [hereinafter Press Re-
lease 2004/23] (announcing date and time that ICJ rendered opinion); Press Release
2004/28, supra note 16 (announcing that ICJ rendered its opinion and found separa-
tion barrier violated international law).
48. See Report Prepared Pursuant to ES-1/13, supra note 11, at Ann. I, 6 (stating
that Israel believes that separation barrier is consistent with notion of self-defense en-
shrined in Article 51 of U.N. Charter); see also Construction of a Wall Case, 43 I.L.M. at
1049-50, 138-39 (noting relevance of Article 51 of U.N. Charter).
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The ICJ, however, found that these arguments did not apply to
the conflict between Israel and the OPT.4" In striking down the
applicability of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, the ICJ stated that
the U.N. Charter only recognizes the right to act in self-defense
in response to an armed attack perpetrated by one State against
another State.5" The ICJ concluded that Israel could not use the
justification of self-defense because the threats could not be at-
tributed to a State, but rather to terrorist organizations. 5' Fur-
thermore, the ICJ noted that the threat came from within the
OPT, an area controlled by Israel, indicating that the attacks
were not acts of international terrorism.52 Therefore, the situa-
49. See Construction of a Wall Case, 43 I.L.M. at 1049-50, 1 138-39 (stating that
Article 51 of U.N. Charter did not apply because attacks were coming from OPT); see
also Lubet, supra note 19 (noting that ICJ found that right of self-defense did not apply
to Israel's right to build separation barrier); New U.N. Assault, supra note 20 (observing
that ICJ found that right to self-defense does not apply to Israeli fight against terror).
50. See Construction of a Wall Case, 43 I.L.M. at 1049-50, 1 139 (stating that Article 51
of U.N. Charter only allows State to act in self-defense in response to armed attack
perpetrated by another State); see also id. at 1063, 1 34 (separate opinion of Higgins J.)
(noting that nothing in text of Article 51 of U.N. Charter requires that attack come
from another State, rather it is result of ICJ determination in Military and Paramilitary
Activities, (Nicar. v. U.S.), [1986] I.C.J 14 ("Nicaragua Case')); id. at 1072, 1 35 (separate
opinion of KooijmansJ.) (concluding that Security Council Resolution 1368 and 1373
recognized new right of self-defense and that ICJ bypassed new element of international
law, implications of which were yet to be determined, but finding that provisions
weren't actually relevant because acts were not international acts but originated from
territory controlled by Israel).
51. See Construction of a Wall Case, 43 I.L.M. at 1049-50, 1 139 (stating that Article 51
of U.N. Charter can not be used to justify action because attacks can not be attributed
to State). But see id. at 1063, 34 (separate opinion of Higgins, J.) (noting that nothing
in text of Article 51 of U.N. Charter requires that attack come from another State,
rather it is result of another ICJ determination in Nicaragua Case); id. at 1072, 1 35
(separate opinion Kooijmans, J.) (concluding that Security Council Resolutions 1368
and 1373 were not actually relevant because cross Green-Line attacks were not interna-
tional acts but originated from territory controlled by Israel); Feinstein, supra note 1 at
67-68 (explaining that nothing in U.N. Charter specifies that only State can perpetrate
an armed attack and that Article 51 of U.N. Charter is broad enough to permit use of
self-defense to counter acts that can not be attributed to State).
52. See Construction of a Wall Case, 43 I.L.M. at 1049-50, 11 39 (finding that Article
51 of U.N. Charter was not relevant because threats came from OPT, area controlled by
Israel); see also id. at 1079, 6 (declaration of Buergenthal, J.) (noting that ICJ's conclu-
sion that Green Line is divide between Israel and OPT, as it has done in implicating
that portions of separation barrier that cross Green Line illegally take control from
OPT, indicated that attacks came from outside area controlled by Israel and right to
self-defense should thus be invoked and that ICJ should not have concluded that sepa-
ration barrier was not justified by self-defense without addressing facts bearing on deci-
sion to build separation barrier and that nothing in Charter requires that exercise of
right of self-defense is contingent upon act of aggression originating with another
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tion was different from the one contemplated in Security Coun-
cil Resolutions 1368 and 1373, which addressed attacks that
originated from territories not controlled by the United States.53
In the discussion, the ICJ never mentioned the word "terrorism"
and did not address the threats coming from the OPT.5 4
In its dispotif, the ICJ recommended that the General As-
sembly and the Security Council consider the necessary action
required to bring an end to the illegal situation.5 The ICJ then
concluded by noting the general context of the situation in
State); id. at 1063, 34 (separate opinion of Higgins, J.) (stating that does not under-
stand ICJ's determination that occupying power loses right to defend its own civilians at
home when the attacks emanate from occupied territory when territory is neither an-
nexed nor part of Israel); McCarthy, supra note 21 (noting that ICJ found separation
barrier to be illegal seizure of property belonging to another country, yet found that
territories were not country for the purposes of self defense issue); New U.N. Assault,
supra note 20 (noting that ICJ had elevated OPT to quasi-State status).
53. See Construction of a Wall Case, 43 I.L.M. at 1049-50, 39 (noting that origin of
attacks against Israel and attacks addressed in Security Council Resolutions 1368 and
1373 are different, and thus Resolutions are not relevant in analysis of self-defense argu-
ment); see also S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 7 (affirming right to act in individual or collec-
tive self-defense after September l1th attacks against United States); S.C. Res. 1373,
supra note 7 (condemning September 11th attacks and reiterating that all acts of inter-
national terrorism pose threat to international peace and security).
54. See Construction of a Wall Case, 43 I.L.M. at 1049-50, 77 138-40 (finding that
Article 51 of U.N. Charter does not apply as Israel suggests because the threat does not
come from another State and because it does not come from area outside Israeli con-
trol and that ICJ does not have requisite evidence to determine that necessity would
justify Israel's actions); see also, id. at 1063, 34 (separate opinion of Higgins, J.) (main-
taining reservations regarding ICJ's interpretation of applicability of Article 51 of U.N.
Charter); id. at 1097, 27 (separate opinion of Owada, J.) (noting importance of con-
sidering separation barrier as part of situation in Middle East with long history); id. at
1079, 1 5 (declaration of Buergenthal, J.) (commenting on importance of addressing
separation barrier in context of deadly attacks that have occurred against citizens of
Israel); id. at 1068, 12 (separate opinion of Kooijmans, J.) (stating that ICJ never put
protections potentially afforded by separation barrier in context of dispute and that ICJ
stated importance of regarding context of dispute as whole); National Post, supra note
19 (noting that that word "terrorism" never appears in Opinion); What the Court Advisory
Opinion Does and Does Not Say, supra note 19 (observing that ICJ did not address defen-
sive role of barrier); Lubet, supra note 19 (noting that treatment of security issue was
dismissive and that ICJ never put protections afforded by separation barrier in context
of larger, ongoing dispute); Ephron, supra note 19 (concluding that even opponents of
separation barrier believed issue was not addressed appropriately).
55. See Construction of a Wall Case, 43 I.L.M. at 1054-56, 1 163 (3)(E) (stating that
Security Council and General Assembly should consider what additional actions are
necessary to bring end to illegal situation resulting from construction of separation
barrier); see also Summary of Advisory Opinion, supra note 15 (noting that ICJ determined
that Security Council and General Assembly should determine additional actions to be
taken by United Nations to ensure that illegal situation created by separation barrier
ends); What the Court Advisory Opinion Does and Does not Say, supra note 19 (observing
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Israel.56 It emphasized the obligation of both Israel and Pales-
tine to observe the rules of international law and the protection
of civilian life. 7 Furthermore, it reiterated the need for a nego-
tiated peace, and the creation of a separate Palestinian State.5"
This Advisory Opinion has implications regarding the analysis of
the legality of other uses of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, such
as U.S. War on Terror. 9
2. U.S. Operation Enduring Freedom
Al Qaeda had launched a series of attacks against the
United States, including attacks against the U.S.S. Cole, the U.S.
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the first bombing of the
that ICJ called on General Assembly and Security Council to consider what further ac-
tion was necessary to bring end to existence of barrier).
56. See Construction of a Wall Case, 43 I.L.M. at 1054, 1 162 (noting that ICJ believes
that construction must be placed in general context of situation in Middle East since
1947); see also id. at 1093-94, 11 11-12 (separate opinion of Owada, J.) (noting that ICJ
should not be expected to consider advisory opinion outside of context of entire con-
flict). But see id. at 1060, 11 15-16 (separate opinion of Higgins, J.) (noting that ICJ
failed to address importance of surrounding circumstances even after recognizing im-
portance of addressing entire conflict); Lubet, supra note 19 (noting that ICJ failed to
address properly Israel's justification for building separation barrier).
57. See Construction of a Wall Case, 43 I.L.M. at 1054, 1 162 (stating that both Israel
and OPT are under obligation to respect rules of international humanitarian law); see
also id. at 1098, 1 31 (separate opinion of Owada, J.) (observing relevance of mutual
resort to indiscriminate acts of violence); id. at 1078, 3 (declaration of Buergenthal,
J.) (maintaining importance of addressing cross Green Line attacks and acts of violence
on both parties); id, at 1087-88, 1 3.1 (separate opinion of Elaraby,J.) (noting that both
parties have duty to respect human rights law); Noah Leavitt, Two Recent Decisions on
Israel's Security Barrier, FindLaw Law Center, July 13, 2004, available at http://cnn-
studentnews.cnn.com/2004/LAW/07/13/leavitt.israel.barrier/ (noting that ICJ dis-
missed Israel's claim of self-defense and ignored fact that Israeli citizens were having
their fundamental right to life violated by terrorists who enter Israel).
58. See Construction of a Wall Case, 43 I.L.M. at 1054, 162 (noting need for peace
in region and for creation of separation of separate Palestinian State); see also Evelyn
Gordon, Arbitration Requires Consent, JERUSALEM POST, July 13, 2004, available at 2004 WL
61260718 (observing that ICJ judges did not attempt to keep politics out of Opinion
and stated its view of appropriate outcome of Israeli-Palestinian conflict, that two sepa-
rate states should be created); National Post, supra note 19 (concluding that Opinion
was political manifesto that ignored Israel's arguments and never mentioned terrorism,
and that ICJ ruled on matter that did not have jurisdiction over because ICJ wanted to
comment on matter); What the Court Advisory Opinion Does and Does Not Say, supra note 19
(criticizing opinion in Construction of a Wall Case for failing to enforce Israel's right to
self-protection).
59. See Lubet, supra note 19 (noting that holding of Construction of a Wall Case indi-
cates that United States is not justified in acting against al Qaeda); see also New U.N.
Assault, supra note 20 (stating that opinion in Construction of a Wall Case had potential to
challenge justifications used by United States in entering war on terror).
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World Trade Center, and other attacks against U.S. nationals
abroad.6 ° One of the stated objectives of al Qaeda is to kill
Americans and their allies, regardless of whether they are part of
the U.S. military.61 Shortly following the September l1th at-
tacks, U.S. President George W. Bush announced that the gov-
ernment would wage a "War on Terror" and would begin with
strikes against al Qaeda and the Taliban.62 Operation Enduring
Freedom began in Afghanistan on October 7th, 2001.63 Strikes
were directed at camps allegedly belonging to al Qaeda and
other Taliban military targets.64 During the military operation,
the United States also provided food to the citizens of Afghani-.
stan and attempted to respect the Islamic culture.6
60. See In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11th, 2001, 349 F. Supp. 2d 765, 785 n.16
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (stating that al Qaeda has been tied to 1993 attack on World Trade
Center and embassy bombings that occurred in 1998); see also King, supra note 1, at 462
(explaining that September 11th attacks were not isolated incident, but were part of
series of attacks by al Qaeda against United States); Paust, supra note 12, at 533 (listing
attacks against U.S.S. Cole, U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and World Trade
Center as some in series of terrorist attacks perpetrated by al Queda against United
States); Saura, supra note 2, at 14 (noting that Taliban Government and al Qaeda were
accused of orchestrating bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania).
61. See Osama bin Laden et al., fihad Against Jews and Crusaders: World Islamic Front
Statement, available at http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm (last
visited Mar. 16, 2005) (proclaiming that it is duty of Muslims to kill Americans and their
allies regardless of whether individuals are affiliated with the military); see also Kas-
tenberg, supra note 2, at 103 (noting that al Qaeda has made statements declaring that
its mission includes killing all Americans, even if they are civilians); Jack M. Beard,
America's New War on Terror: The Case for Self-Defense Under International Law, 25 HARv. J.L.
& PUB POL'Y 559, 587-88 (2004) (observing that September 11th attacks were part of
ongoing campaign perpetrated by al Qaeda terrorist organization that has proclaimed
that it will continue its campaign of terror until America surrenders or is destroyed).
62. See George W. Bush, Presidential Address to ajoint Session of Congress (Sept.
20, 2001), available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2001/09/
mil-010920-usia0l.htm (outlining presidential plan to begin War on Terror); see also
Sadat, supra note 2, at 136-37 (explaining that on September 20, 2001, U.S. President
Bush presented plan to Congress to initiate war on terror).
63. See Sadat, supra note 2, at 137 (stating that Operation Enduring Freedom be-
gan on October 7, 2001); see also Saura, supra note 2, at 24 (noting that Operation
Enduring Freedom was launched on October 7, 2001, almost one month after Septem-
ber 11 th attacks); George K. Walker, The Lawfulness of Operation Enduring Freedom s Self-
Defense Respones, 37 VAL. U. L. REv. 489, 509 (2003) (describing early days of Operation
Enduring Freedom and explaining that as of October 7, 2001, military operations in
Afghanistan dominated War on Terror).
64. See Walker, supra note 63, at 509 (clarifying that military operation was directed
towards Taliban military targets and camps of al Qaeda members); see also Schmitt, As-
sessment, supra note 1, at 738 (observing that Operation Enduring Freedom was
launched against al Qaeda and Taliban targets in Afghanistan).
65. See Walker, supra note 63, at 512 (explaining that during Operation Enduring
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The United States initiated military action against al Qaeda
and the Taliban as an exercise of its right of self-defense under
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.66 The United States took action
to deter and prevent future attacks on the United States by the al
Qaeda terrorist network.67 Immediately following the start of
Operation Enduring Freedom, Osama bin Laden, the individual
believed to have organized all of the attacks against the United
States, released a pre-recorded tape in which he praised all Mus-
lims who attacked Americans.68
Al Qaeda is a non-State affiliated, Islam-based group that
claims to speak on behalf of umma, the global community of
Muslims, and is determined to fight all enemies on behalf of the
organization. 69 The group was organized in 1989 to coordinate
Freedom, food supply was critical but that United States allocated resources to help
provide for the need); see also King, supra note 1, at 469-71 (observing that U.S. officials
argue that military operations have been strategic and have aimed to minimize civilian
casualty).
66. See Giblert Guillame, Terrorism and International Law, 53 INT'L & COMP. L. Q.
537, 545-46 (2004) (explaining that military actions against al Qaeda and Taliban were
undertaken under Article 51 of U.N. Charter and that United States did not seek au-
thorization for military action from Security Council); see also Saura, supra note 2, at 22
(clarifying that Operation Enduring Freedom was justified by principle of self-defense
and was neither authorized nor supported by Security Council Resolutions adopted
immediately following the September 11 th attacks); Sean D. Murphy, Terrorism and the
Concept of "Armed Attack" in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 41, 44 (2003)
(stating that Security Council did not authorize United States to use force in Afghani-
stan) [hereinafter Murphy, Terrorism and the Concept of Armed Attack].
67. See Sadat, supra note 2, at 139 (stating that as part of Operation Enduring Free-
dom, United States has taken action to help deter and prevent attacks by taking mea-
sures against terrorist training camps and military installations); see also Beard, supra
note 61, at 578 (concluding that link between Taliban, al Qaeda, and September 11 th
attacks is well established).
68. See Bin Laden's Warning: Full Text, Oct. 7, 2003, available at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/1/low/world/southasia/1585636.stm (giving full text of warning is-
sued by Osama Bin Laden on October 7, 2001 warning that United States and those
who live in United States will no longer live in peace); see also Walker, supra note 63, at
510-11 (explaining that on day that Operation Enduring Freedom Began, Osama bin
Laden released tape on which he praised Muslims for their attacks against American
and called on all Muslims to make religious victories).
69. See Philpott, supra note 2, at 988 (observing that al Qaeda is non-State actor
that claims to speak on behalf of globalized community of Muslims, also known as
umma); see also Juan R. Torruella, On the Slippery Slopes of Afghanistan: Military Commis-
sions and the Exercise of Presidential Power, 4 U. PA. J. CONST L. 648, 651, n. 12 (2002)
(explaining that al Qaeda is umbrella organization that coordinates activities for the
global Muslim community against enemies of Islam); Joseph E. Ritch, They'll Make You
an Offer You Can't Refuse: A Comparative Analysis of International Organized Crime, 9 TULSA
J. COMP. & INT'L L. 569, 573-74 (2002) (noting that al Qaeda is multi-national support
group that funds and organizes activities on behalf of Islamic movement).
844 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 28:827
plans and recruit individuals for a jihad, or religious war, against
Soviets in Afghanistan.7 ° Osama bin Laden is considered the
leader of this organization. 71 Like Hamas, al Quaeda's gov-
erning philosophy incorporates the Koran.72 In 1996, Osama
bin Laden issued a fatwa,73 known as the Ladenese Epistle that
urged all Muslims to take arms against the United States in a
jihad.7 ' Additionally, in 1998 bin Laden issued another fatwa
urging Muslims to kill Americans and Jews.75
The international community supported Operation Endur-
70. See Torruella, supra note 69, at 651, n.12 (observing that al Qaeda was origi-
nally formed to organize individuals for coordinated attacks against Soviets in Afghani-
stan); see also Ritch, supra note 69, at 573-74 (explaining that al Qaeda is multi-national
group that funds and organizes acts of terror, and was formed in response to Afghan-
Soviet War).
71. SeeTorruella, supra note 69, at 651, n.12 (noting that most consider Osama bin
Laden to be in control of al Qaeda); see also Ritch, supra note 69, at 573-74 (explaining
that al Qaeda was formed by Osama Bin Laden); Maxwell 0. Chibundu, For God, For
Country, For Universalism: Sovereignty as Solidarity in Our Age of Terror, 56 FLA. L. REV. 883,
892-93 (2004) (observing that Osama bin Laden is leader of al Qaeda and has been
credited with masterminding attacks against United States).
72. See Kastenberg, supra note 2, at 105 (noting that al Qaeda's underlying philoso-
phy includes a literal reading of the Koran); see also Philpott, supra note 2, at 987 (stat-
ing that September 11 th attacks were carried out by Islamic revivalists who have com-
menced jihad, or religious war, against United States); Torruella, supra note 69, n.12
(observing that Osama bin Laden, alleged leader of al Qaeda, has issued at least two
Fatwahs, or documents issued by religious leaders and scholars to give guidance to fol-
lowers of Islam, which are binding upon them); Cohan, Formulation, supra note 30, at 98
(stating that Osama bin Laden called on Muslims to begin Holy War, or jihad, against
"Americans and Jews").
73. See Torruella, supra note 69, at 651, n.12 (defining fatwa as decree issued to
followers of Islam to give guidance and binds them to actions called for in decree); see
also Oren Asman, Abortion in Islamic Countries - Legal and Religious Aspects, 23 MED. & L.
73, 77 (2004) (describing fatwa as explanation or clarification of issue by person who is
learned in Islamic Law).
74. See Ladenese Epistle: Declaration of War: Part I, available at http://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A4342-2001Sep21 (excerpting Ladenese Epistle) (last vis-
ited March 12, 2005); see also Torruella, supra note 69, at 651, n.12 (explaining that
Osama bin Laden issued decree called fatwa, calling on all Muslims to take arms against
Americans); Cohan, Formulation, supra note 30, at 98 (noting that Osama bin Laden
issued fatwa calling for Muslims to embark on religious war or jihad against the United
States); Philpott, supra note 2, at 987 (explaining that members of al Qaeda are Islamic
revivalists who have launched religious war against defilers of Islam, including United
States).
75. See Torruella, supra note 69, n.12 (noting that Osama bin Laden issued an-
other fatwa on February 22, 1998, stating that members should kill Americans and
Jews); see also Osama bin Laden, Al-Qaeda, and the Jihad (Holy War), available at http://
www.septemberllnews.com/OsamaBinLaden.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2005) (ex-
cerpting portion of 1998 Fatwa).
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ing Freedom.76 It did not condemn the use of force in response
to the September l1th attacks." That support, combined with
the language of Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373, in-
dicates that the international community accepts that a terrorist
act of the magnitude of the September 11 th attacks constitutes
an armed attack, thus enabling a State to legally use force under
Article 51.78 While Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ recognizes
this acceptance as evidence of international customary law, the
ICJ has not yet held that such grave acts would constitute an
armed attack.79
76. See Stahn, supra note 1, at 35 (observing international community supported
Operation Enduring Freedom); see also Schmitt, Assessment, supra note 1, at 748 (argu-
ing that international acceptance of response to September llth attacks indicates that
international community approves use of force in response to transnational terrorism);
Michael N. Schmitt, Preemptive Strategies in International Law, 24 MIcH. J. INT'L L. 513,
536-39 (2003) (observing that North Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO") and Or-
ganization of American States ("OAS") and Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Geor-
gia, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Philippines,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Tajikistan, Turkey, Uzbekistan, and United Kingdom
all provided support to Operation Enduring Freedom, indicating that States apply law
of self-defense to acts perpetrated by non-State actors) [hereinafter Schmitt, Preemptive
Strategies].
77. See Murphy, Terrorism and the Concept of Armed Attack, supra note 66, at 47 (not-
ing that while past terrorist activities may not have constituted armed attack, scale of
September 11 th attacks were grave enough to meet level of armed attack and that inter-
national community accepted this interpretation, which was demonstrated through sup-
port given to Operation Enduring Freedom); see also Stahn, supra note 1, at 36 (observ-
ing that September l1th attacks reached magnitude that no other terrorist strike had
reached); King, supra note 1, at 471 (concluding that threat of attacks such as those that
occurred on September 11 th has changed way that international law is used and inter-
preted because demonstrated enormity of terrorist capabilities); Beard, supra note 61,
at 574-75 (commenting that because attacks caused extensive loss of life and severe
damage to property, strikes were category of armed attack).
78. SeeJudgment of Nov. 6, 2003, Oil Platforms Case (Iran v. U.S.), 51, available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iop/iopjudgment/iop ijudgment_20031106.
PDF (noting that for series of attacks to constitute armed attack, it would have to be
considered grave use of force); see also Nicaragua Case, [ 1986] I.C.J. 14, 101, 191 (con-
cluding that in determining whether action constituted armed attack, must distinguish
between uses of force and most grave uses of force); Schmitt, Assessment, supra, note 1,
at 761-63 (arguing that acceptance of Operation Enduring Freedom by international
community demonstrates their appreciation of emergence of new international terror-
ism and that American strategy is consistent with this shift, and concluding that in 21st
Century the international community has come to accept use of force against non-State
actors so long as all requirements of self-defense have been met); Feinstein, supra note
1, at 55 (commenting that international community recognizes that new reality of na-
ture of terrorist organizations requires new thinking in order for States to protect citi-
zens).
79. See Statute of the I.C.J., art. 38 (recognizing that international custom is evi-
dence of accepted law); see also Oil Platforms Case, 51, available at http://www.icj-cij.
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B. Statutory Standards for Review by the International Court of
Justice ("ICJ")
In order for the ICJ to have jurisdiction to hear a case two
requirements must be met.8 0 First, the request for the advisory
opinion must be properly made, giving the ICJ jurisdiction to
answer the question presented to it."' Second, the ICJ must de-
termine whether there are any reasons why it should decline to
give a response to the question presented. 2
The Statute of the ICJ allows the ICJ to answer a request
from any body authorized by the U.N. Charter."3 The U.N.
Charter authorizes the General Assembly to file a request for an
opinion. 4 In order for a question, and thus a request for an
org/icjwww/idocket/iop/iopjudgment/iop-ijudgment_20031106.PDF (noting that se-
ries of attacks will only be considered armed attack if it is grave use of force); Murphy,
Terrorism and the Concept of Armed Attack, supra note 66, at 47-48 (observing that interna-
tional community accepted that September 11th attacks were grave use of force which
was demonstrated through support given to Operation Enduring Freedom); King, supra
note 1, at 471 (finding that threat of additional attacks of magnitude of September 11th
attacks has changed way that international law is used and interpreted because demon-
strated enormity of terrorist capabilities).
80. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, [1996] I.C.J 226, 232, 1 10
(stating that ICJ must determine both whether it has jurisdiction to hear case and
whether it should choose to exercise that jurisdiction) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons
Case]; see also Construction of a Wall Case, 43 I.L.M. 1009, 1024, 44 (July 9, 2004) (noting
that ICJ has discretionary power to decline to give Advisory Opinion); Summary of Advi-
sory Opinion, supra note 15 (noting that there are instances ICJ should decline to exer-
cise jurisdiction).
81. See Statute of the I.C.J., art. 65, 1 (defining competence of ICJ); see also Con-
struction of a Wall Case, 43 I.L.M. at 1016, 7 13, 14 (stating that precondition of ICJ's
competence is that request must come from body duly authorized by Charter, and that
question must arise within scope of that body's duties); Application for Review ofJudgment
No. 273 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, Advisory Opinion, [1982] I.C.J. 325,
333-34, 21 (noting that request must come from duly authorized body and question
must arise out of body's duties).
82. See Nuclear Weapons Case, [1996] I.C.J at 232, 1 10 (stating that ICJ must deter-
mine both whether it has jurisdiction to hear case and whether it should choose to
exercise that jurisdiction); see also Construction of a Wall Case, 43 I.L.M. at 1024, 1 44
(observing that jurisdiction is two part inquiry, whether there is statutory jurisdiction
and whether there is any reason to decline to exercise jurisdiction); Summary of Advisory
Opinion, supra note 15 (noting that there are instances ICJ should decline to exercise
jurisdiction).
83. See Statute of the I.C.J., art. 65 (stating that ICJ can give advisory opinion in
response to question asked by authorized body); see also Nuclear Weapons Case, [1996]
I.C.J. at 232, 10 (explaining that ICJ gets authorization to give advisory opinions from
Article 65 of Statute of ICJ); Construction of a Wall Case, 43 I.L.M. at 1017, 15 (noting
that General Assembly may request advisory opinion).
84. See U.N. CHARTER, art. 96 (stating that General Assembly or Security Council
can request an advisory opinion); see also Construction of a Wall Case, 43 I.L.M. at 1017,
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opinion, to be valid, however, it must fall within the scope of the
duties of the General Assembly.8 5 Article 11 of the U.N. Charter
charges the General Assembly with the duty to hear all cases as-
sociated with maintaining international peace and security
brought to it by both Member States and non-Members.8 6 The
General Assembly can also make recommendations for peaceful
changes to any situation that it determines will likely impact the
friendly relations and general welfare among Nations. 7 Article
12 of the U.N. Charter limits the ability to issue recommenda-
tions by providing that the General Assembly cannot issue rec-
ommendations on issues before the Security Council. 8
Despite this potential limitation, General Assembly Resolu-
tion 377(V), Uniting for Peace, has been interpreted to allow the
Security Council and the General Assembly to deal simultane-
ously with matters when the issue focuses on the maintenance of
international peace and one permanent Member prevents the
Security Council from issuing resolutions." When this occurs,
15 (noting that General Assembly is authorized to make a request); Nuclear Weapons
Case [1996] I.CJ, at 232, 11 (explaining that General Assembly is body authorized to
make such request).
85. See Comments on White Paper, supra note 21 (noting that while General As-
sembly is authorized, there are many claims that General Assembly acted outside of its
powers); Nuclear Weapons Case, [1996] I.C.J. at 232, 1 11-12 (explaining that Security
Council and General Assembly are not permitted to ask questions unrelated to their
work); Construction of a Wall Case, 43 I.L.M. at 1017, 1 15-17 (noting that ICJ has
looked at relationship between General Assembly and nature of question to determine
if question falls within its duties).
86. See U.N. CHARTER art. 11, 2 (allowing General Assembly to hear all issues
regarding maintenance of international peace); see also Construction of a Wall Case, 43
I.L.M. at 1017, 17 (describing competence of General Assembly to make requests).
87. See U.N. CHARTER art. 11, 1 (enabling General Assembly to make recommen-
dations regarding issues brought before it); see also Construction of a Wall Case, 43 I.L.M.
at 1017, 1 17 (explaining ability of General Assembly to make requests).
88. See U.N. CHARTER art. 12, 1 (stating that General Assembly shall not make
recommendations regarding issues that are before Security Council); see also Construc-
tion of a Wall Case, 43 I.L.M. at 1019, 1 24, 25 (recognizing limitation placed on author-
ity of General Assembly to make recommendations and that Israel raised this issue,
alleging that General Assembly, by requesting advisory opinion, had acted ultra vires
under U.N. Charter).
89. See Construction of a Wall Case, 43 I.L.M. at 1019, 27 (noting trend to allow
General Assembly and Security Council to hear matters at same time); see also Uniting
for Peace, G.A. Res. 377(V), U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 20, 1, U.N. Doc. A/
1775 (1950) (allowing General Assembly to make recommendations if Security Council
is unable to act in matters regarding security due to lack of unanimity of permanent
members); Comments on White Paper, supra note 21 (noting that General Assembly's
Uniting for Peace Resolution declared ability of General Assembly to act in instances
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the General Assembly addresses the economic, humanitarian,
and social aspects in its recommendations. °°
In deciding if the ICJ has jurisdiction to hear a case, the ICJ
must undertake a further inquiry after the procedural require-
ments. 1 Article 65 of the Statute of the ICJ says that the ICJ may
issue an advisory opinion.92 The Judges have interpreted this to
mean that after determining that the request for an advisory
opinion was proper, they must inquire whether there are any
reasons why they should decline to hear the case.9 3 In the Con-
struction of a Wall Case, the ICJ augmented its previous decisions
determining when it would be appropriate to decline to exercise
jurisdiction. 4
where, because of lack of unanimity of permanent members, Security Council fails to
maintain international peace and security).
90. See Construction of a Wall Case, 43 I.L.M. at 1019, 27 (noting that General
Assembly focuses on humanitarian, social and economic impact of conflict and citing
other examples of such situations, including those involving Angola, Bosnia and Herze-
govina, Cyprus, Somalia, South Africa, and Southern Rhodesia); see also Comments on
White Paper, supra note 21 (observing that the Uniting For Peace Resolution was used
in Suez Crisis of 1956 and Congo Crisis of 1963).
91. See Nuclear Weapons Case, [1996] I.C.J at 232, 10 (stating that ICJ must deter-
mine both whether it has jurisdiction to hear case and whether it should choose to
exercise that jurisdiction); see also Construction of a Wall Case, 43 I.L.M. at 1024, 44
(explaining ICJ must address both whether it has jurisdiction to hear case and whether
there it should hear case); Summary of Advisory Opinion, supra note 15 (noting that there
are instances where ICJ should decline to exercise jurisdiction).
92. See Statute of the I.C.J., art. 65, 1 (stating that ICJ may issue advisory opinion
on any legal question asked of it by authorized body of United Nations); Nuclear Weap-
ons Case, [1996] I.C.J. at 232, 1 10 (noting that ICJ draws its competence from Article 65
of Statute of ICJ which states that ICJ may give advisory opinion, indicating that there is
two step inquiry, whether ICJ has jurisdiction and whether to exercise jurisdiction
would be within judicial character of ICJ).
93. See Construction of a Wall Case, 43 I.L.M. at 1024, 1 44 (stating that although ICJ
may hear case it does not have to if there are reasons for it to decline jurisdiction); see
also Nuclear Weapons Case, [1996] I.C.J. at 234-35, 14 (noting that Statute of ICJ leaves
it to ICJ to determine if it should hear case after it determines its competence).
94. See Gordon, supra note 57 (concluding that that ICJ disregarded consent re-
quirement, one of cardinal protections guaranteed in ICJ Charter); see also Decision Dis-
misses Israel's Arguments, supra note 12 (finding that ICJ's Opinion may provide prece-
dent for ICJ to bring sovereign States before ICJ and force State to defend policy before
ICJ); Draft Resolution Demands Israel's Compliance to be Considered Monday, 19July, United
Nations Press Release GA/10246 (Jul. 16, 2004) [hereinafter press Release GA/10246]
(stating that several States believe decision to hear case improperly evaded consent re-
quirement and inappropriately politicized ICJ).
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II. RECENT INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE ("ICJ")
DECISIONS AFFECTING THE WAR ON TERROR
The ICJ has rendered an opinion on the construction of a
separation barrier by Israel to protect against the cross Green-
Line strikes. 5 In the Construction of a Wall Case, the ICJ altered
its previous determinations of when it is appropriate to exercise
jurisdiction.96 Further, the ICJ set a dangerous precedent that
may have implications for the United States and the rest of the
international community in its fight against international terror-
ism. 97
A. A New Interpretation of Jurisdiction
The request in the Construction of a Wall Case conformed
with the procedural requirements of both the U.N. Charter and
the ICJ Statute. 8 After determining that the ICJ had jurisdiction
to issue an advisory opinion, the ICJ had the duty to determine
whether any reason existed to decline to exercise its jurisdic-
95. See Construction of a Wall Case, 43 I.L.M. 1009, 1054-56, 1 163 (stating that ICJ
issued advisory opinion for Construction of a Wall Case on July 9, 2004); see also Press
Release 2004/28, supra note 16 (announcing that ICJ issued advisory opinion on Con-
struction of Wall).
96. See Construction of a Wall Case, 43 I.L.M. at 1060, 12-13 (separate opinion of
Higgins, J,) (noting that ICJ found that this dispute was not bilateral because ICJ had
issued opinions on matter); see also Gordon, supra note 58 (noting that in future Gen-
eral Assembly will be able to bring any matter before ICJ by issuing resolutions and
becoming involved in matter); Construction of a Wall Case, 43 I.L.M. at 1095-96, 20
(separate opinion of Owada, J.) (stating that lack of consent does not deprive ICJ of
jurisdiction, but ICJ must remain fair in administration of justice, which becomes more
difficult when one party is not required to present ICJ with relevant information, and
noting that while there was abundance of information provided to ICJ, it was very one-
sided); id. at 1078, 1 (declaration of Buergenthal, J.) (concluding that while ICJ stated
that it had relevant information, fact that it later stated that it did not believe, based on
facts, that separation barrier provided desired security objectives indicates that there
was not enough information).
97. See Lubet, supra note 2 (noting that logic of ICJ in Construction of a Wall Case
would indicate that United States would not be justified in acting against al Qaeda, but
that action was permitted by Security Council in Resolutions 1368 and 1373); see also
New U.N. Assault, supra note 20 (observing that dispotif in Construction of a Wall Case had
potential to challenge justifications used by United States in entering war on terror).
98. See U.N. CHARTER art. 35, 1 1 (stating that General Assembly and Security
Council may request advisory opinion); see also Statute of the I.CJ., arts. 65-68 (an-
nouncing procedural requirements of advisory opinions); Construction of a Wall Case, 43
I.L.M. at 1024, 28 (stating that ICJ found that it had jurisdiction to hear case); Press
Release 2004/28, supra note 95 (asserting that ICJ voted unanimously that it had juris-
diction to hear case).
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tion.99 Member States, commentators, and even ICJ Judges
raised many issues regarding the ICJ's jurisdiction and decision
to give an advisory opinion."' 0 Three of the principle arguments
against the exercise of jurisdiction that the ICJ had previously
determined would make it inappropriate to give an opinion in-
cluded: (1) where the request circumvents the principle that
States must consent to involvement in a dispute brought before
the ICJ;1 ' (2) when the case involves a bi-lateral dispute;1 12 and
(3) where the ICJ does not have all of the information necessary
99. See Construction of a Wall Case, 43 I.L.M. at 1024, 1 44 (stating that although ICJ
may hear case it does not have to if there are reasons for it to decline jurisdiction); see
also Nuclear Weapons Case, [1996] I.CJ 226, 232, 14 (noting that Statute of ICJ leaves it
to ICJ to determine if it should hear case after it determines its competence).
100. See Douglass Cassell, World View Comment. No. 188; The World Court and Israel's
Wal4 Feb. 25, 2004 available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/depts/clinic/ihr/dis-
play-details.cfm?ID=383&document-type-commentary (observing that opponents ar-
gue that Advisory Opinion in Construction of a Wall Case would intrude on privileges of
Security Council, require fact-finding, politicize ICJ, violate Israel's sovereignty by de-
ciding case without its consent, and threaten peace process); see also Construction of a
Wall Case, 43 I.L.M. at 1025-29, 99 46-63 (stating that some arguments against ICJ exer-
cising jurisdiction that were addressed in Opinion include: wisdom of issuing opinion
regarding contentious matter between Israel and Palestine, impact on negotiated
peace, role of separation barrier as part of larger conflict, availability of requisite facts,
purpose of opinion, and fault of Palestine with regard to conflict); Comments on White
Paper, supra note 21 (examining various reasons why ICJjurisdiction may be improper).
101. See Rozenberg, supra note 18 (noting that ICJ has declined to exercise juris-
diction when parties do not consent); see also Western Sahara Advisory Opinion, [ 1975]
I.C.J. 12, 25, 1 33 (concluding that when one party does not consent to dispute, pro-
viding advisory opinion may not be within judicial character of ICJ) [hereinafter Western
Sahara Case]; Construction of a Wall Case, 43 I.L.M. at 1025, 46 (stating that Israel did
not consent to proceedings before ICJ); Comments on White Paper, supra note 21 (re-
marking that advisory opinion should not be used to avoid principle of consent-based
jurisdiction); Construction of a Wall Case, 43 I.L.M. at 1059, 9 (commenting that issue
of consent of parties is still relevant in deciding to exercise discretion); Summary of Advi-
soy Opinion, supra note 15 (noting that many contend that ICJ should decline jurisdic-
tion because Israel has not consented to matter); Leavitt, supra note 57 (reiterating that
Israel did not consent to jurisdiction); McCarthy, supra note 21 (observing that corner-
stone of legal exchange as means of conflict resolution is consent); Gordon, supra note
58 (concluding that ruling eliminates notion that arbitration requires consent and re-
quirement of consent was one of principle protections guaranteed in ICJ Charter).
102. See Construction of a Wall Case, 43 I.L.M. at 1026, 49 (noting that while many
contend this dispute is bilateral in nature, United Nations has become involved and
request is to help General Assembly exercise its proper function as defined in several
resolutions regarding matter, and thus dispute is not simply bilateral in nature and can
be heard by ICJ); see also id at 1060, 99 6-7 (separate opinion of HigginsJ.) (comment-
ing that ICJ recognized that dispute was between two international actors); id. at 1091,
1093, 2, 10 (separate opinion of Owada, J) (remarking that ICJ should have more
closely addressed nature of dispute in its determination not to exercise discretion).
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to issue an advisory opinion.'0 3 All three were present in the
Construction of a Wall Case, yet the ICJ decided to issue its opin-
ion, thus altering jurisdictional analysis.1"4
Israel did not consent to the jurisdiction of the ICJ regard-
ing the matter. 10 5 The Statute of the ICJ only requires that par-
ties give consent in contentious matters, but states that the prin-
ciple may be relevant in advisory proceedings. 0 6 The ICJ has
never declined to give an advisory opinion due to lack of con-
sent;107 however, its predecessor, the Permanent Court of Inter-
103. See Western Sahara Case, [1975] I.CJ. at 28-29 46 (stating that ICJ must have
all necessary information in order to issue advisory opinion and must remain faithful to
requirements of judicial character by remaining fair to both parties); see also Construc-
tion of a Wall Case, 43 I.L.M. at 1078, 1080-81, 1, 7, 10 (declaration of Buergenthal,
J.) (reiterating belief that ICJ should have declined to give advisory opinion in Construc-
tion of a Wall Case because relevant information was not available to ICJ and that Israel
was not under obligation to provide relevant information because it did not consent to
jurisdiction, and that ICJ never addressed facts relating to Israel's position); id. at 1091,
1096, 9 21, 22 (separate opinion of Owada, J.) (finding that ICJ did not have requisite
facts regarding Israel's position and that while Israel is not required to provide facts, ICJ
is permitted to seek supplemental information to that provided by parties); Rozenberg,
supra note 18 (noting that ICJ has declined to issue advisory opinions where it did not
have all relevant information).
104. See Construction of a Wall Case, 43 I.L.M. at 1060, 1112, 13 (separate opinion of
Higgins, J.) (stating that ICJ found that this dispute was not bilateral because ICJ had
issued opinions on matter); see also Gordon, supra note 57 (concluding that in future
General Assembly will be able to bring any matter before ICJ by issuing resolutions and
becoming involved in matter); Construction of a Wall Case, 43 I.L.M. at 1091, 1095-96,
20 (separate opinion of Owada, J.) (observing that lack of consent does not deprive ICJ
of jurisdiction, but ICJ must remain fair in administration of justice which becomes
more difficult when one party is not required to present ICJ with relevant information,
and noting that while there was abundance of information provided to ICJ, it was very
one sided); id. at 1078, 1, 3, 4 (declaration of Buergenthal, J.) (concluding that
while ICJ stated that it had relevant information, fact that it later stated that it did not
believe, based on facts, that separation barrier provided desired security objectives indi-
cates that there was not enough information).
105. See Construction of a Wall Case, 43 I.L.M. at 1025, 46 (stating that Israel did
not consent to proceedings before ICJ); see also Summary of Advisory Opinion, supra note
15 (reporting that many contend that ICJ should decline jurisdiction because Israel has
not consented to matter); Leavitt, supra note 57 (reiterating that Israel did not consent
to jurisdiction).
106. See Statute of the I.CJ., arts. 26, 68 (requiring that parties consent in conten-
tious matters and that ICJ consider principles of propriety for contentious matters when
giving advisory opinion); see also Western Sahara Case, [1975] I.CJ at 20, 21 (stating
that lack of consent does not deprive ICJ of jurisdiction, but rather is consideration in
determining propriety of giving advisory opinion); Construction of a Wall Case, 43 I.L.M.
at 1059, 10 (separate opinion of Higgins, J.) (explaining that in Western Sahara Case,
ICJ affirmed principle that consent is not requirement for jurisdiction, but is relevant in
determining judicial propriety of giving advisory opinion).
107. See Construction of a Wall Case, 43 I.L.M. at 1024, 44 (stating that while Israel
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national Justice ("PCIJ") declined to give an advisory opinion in
the Status of Eastern Carelia Case ("Eastern Carelia Case') because
one party did not consent.'0 8 The ICJ addressed the relevance
of this principle to jurisdiction of the ICJ in the Western Sahara
Advisory Opinion ("Western Sahara Casi'). 109 In the Western Sahara
Case, Spain contested the jurisdiction of the ICJ in an advisory
proceeding because it did not consent to the matter. ° Spain
relied on the decision in Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulga-
ria, Hungary and Romania, First Phase ("Peace Treaties Case') and
on Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South
Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) ("South West Africa Case')
both of which addressed the relevance of the PCIJ holding in ICJ
proceedings.'11 In determining that it did have jurisdiction in
contends that ICJ should decline to give advisory opinion in Construction of a Wall Case
due to lack of consent, ICJ has never declined to give advisory opinion due to lack of
consent); see also Nuclear Weapons Case, [1996] I.C.J 226, 235, 9 14 (noting that ICJ had
not refused to act upon request for advisory opinion).
108. See Advisory Opinion, Status of Eastern Carelia, [1923] P.C.I.J. ser. B, No. 5
[hereinafter Eastern Carelia Case] (declining to give advisory opinion on matter between
Finland and Russia because party that was not member of League of Nations did not
consent to jurisdiction); Construction of a Wall Case, 43 I.L.M. at 1024, 1 44 (explaining
that ICJ has never declined jurisdiction due to lack of consent of one party while its
predecessor, Permanent Court of International Justice ("PCIJ") only did so once); Nu-
clear Weapons Case, [1996] I.C.J. at 235, 1 14 (clarifying that only PCIJ had ever declined
to give advisory opinion).
109. See Western Sahara Case, [1975] I.C.J. at 21-27, 11 24-42 (explaining that while
Spain contested jurisdiction of ICJ because it did not consent to proceedings, issuance
of advisory opinion did not violate principles of judicial propriety); see also Construction
of a Wall Case, 43 I.L.M. at 1024-29, 11 42-65 (applying principles of judicial propriety
explained in Western Sahara Case to Construction of a Wall Case); id. at 1059, 11 9-10
(separate opinion of Higgins, J.) (reiterating discussion of judicial propriety in Western
Sahara Case); iL at 1093-94, 11 12-13 (separate opinion of Owada, J.) (discussing rele-
vance of jurisdictional principles elucidated in Western Sahara Case).
110. See Western Sahara Case, [1975] I.C.J at 22, 1 25 (observing that Spain con-
tested jurisdiction of ICJ because it did not consent to proceedings); see also Michla
Pomerance, The Badinter Commission: The Use and Misuse of the International Court ofJus-
tice's Jurisprudence, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 31, 46 (1998) (noting absence of consent of
Spain in Western Sahara Case did not preclude ICJ from issuing advisory opinion).
111. See Western Sahara Case, [1975] I.C.J. at 23, 1 28 (stating that Spain relied on
precedent of Status of Eastern Carelia Case, and Peace Treaties Case in arguing that ICJ did
not have jurisdiction to give advisory opinion because Spain did not consent to pro-
ceedings); see also Construction of a Wall Case, 43 I.L.M. at, 1059, 1 10 (separate opinion
of Higgins, J.) (explaining that while Spain relied on precedent of Peace Treaties Case
and Eastern Carelia Case, ICJ found that cases merely meant that lack of consent may
make issuance of advisory opinion incompatible with judicial character but does not
prevent ICJ from giving advisory opinion); Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulga-
ria, Hungary and Romania, First Phase, [1950] I.C.J. 65 (answering questions regarding
implementation of peace treaties between Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania); Legal
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the Western Sahara Case, the ICJ first reiterated the principle that
consent is not a requirement in advisory proceedings, such as
the Construction of a Wall Case, but only in contentious proceed-
ings. 1 2 Additionally, it noted that the decision of the PCIJ was
premised on the fact that the party that did not consent to juris-
diction was neither a member of the League of Nations, nor a
party to the Statute of the PCIJ.l 1 On the basis of these distinc-
tions, the ICJ found that it did have jurisdiction in the Western
Sahara Case.114
The ICJ did note that lack of consent, if it would render an
advisory opinion incompatible with the judicial character of the
ICJ, was reason enough to decline to give an advisory opinion.115
One example of this would be if the purpose of the request has
the effect of bypassing the principle that a State is not obligated
to have its disputes settled without its consent. 116 In the Western
Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South
West Africa), [1971] I.C.J. 16 (advising Security Council in responsibilities regarding
decolonization of South West Africa) [hereinafter South West Africa Case].
112. See Western Sahara Case, [1975] I.C.J. at 20, 21 (stating that lack of consent
does not deprive ICJ ofjurisdiction, but rather is consideration in determining propri-
ety of giving advisory opinion); see also Sienho Yee, Forum Prorogatum and the Advisory
Proceedings of the International Court, 95 Am. J. Ir'r'L L. 381, 382-83 (2001) (reiterating
principle that advisory jurisdiction comes from U.N. Charter Article 96 and Statute of
I.C.J. Article 65, not from consent of States); Construction of a Wall Case, 43 I.L.M. at
1059, 9 10 (separate opinion of Higgins, J.) (explaining that in Western Sahara Case, ICJ
affirmed principle that consent is not requirement for jurisdiction, but is relevant in
determining judicial propriety of giving advisory opinion).
113. See Western Sahara Case, [1975] I.C.J. at 23-24, 1 30 (explaining that in Eastern
Carelia Case, PCIJ did not have jurisdiction because party that did not consent was
neither member of League of Nations nor a party to Statute of the PCIJ); see also Yee,
supra note 112, at 383 (reiterating that lack of consent may affect propriety of advisory
opinion).
114. See Western Sahara Case, [1975] I.C.J. at 25, 1 34 (finding that facts of Western
Sahara Case were different from those contemplated in previous instances where ICJ
had declined to give advisory opinion, and that to issue advisory opinion would be
within judicial character of ICJ); see alsoYee, supra note 112, at 382-83 (observing that in
Western Sahara Case ICJ reiterated principle that lack of consent does not deprive ICJ of
jurisdiction and that ICJ issued advisory proceeding).
115. See Western Sahara Case, [1975] I.C.J. at 25 1 32-33 (reiterating principle that
jurisdiction in advisory proceedings is permissive, and that while lack of consent does
not deprive ICJ ofjurisdiction, it may make giving advisory opinion fall outside ofjudi-
cial character); see also Construction of a Wall Case, 43 I.L.M. at 1025, 1 47 (referring to
principle that although lack of consent does not have bearing on jurisdiction for advi-
sory proceeding, but may impact propriety of giving opinion).
116. See Construction of a Wall Case, 43 I.L.M. at 1025, 1 47 (explaining that one way
in which lack of consent may make issuance of advisory opinion fall outside of judicial
character is if reply to request would bypass principle that State is not obliged to have its
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Sahara Case, the ICJ concluded that the case involved a legal con-
troversy that arose during the proceedings of the General Assem-
bly, not during bilateral relations between two States, and thus
the issuance of an advisory opinion would not violate the princi-
ples ofjudicial propriety. 117 Judge Owada andJudge Higgins ex-
pressed their belief that in granting jurisdiction in the Construc-
tion of a Wall Case, the ICJ should have addressed whether giving
an opinion would bypass the principle that a State is not re-
quired to have its disputes settled by the ICJ without its con-
sent."l Instead, the ICJ declared that due to the General Assem-
bly's responsibility regarding the maintenance of international
peace and security, the issues presented in the Construction of a
Wall Case are express concerns of the General Assembly, and
thus jurisdiction does not violate the principle set out in the
Western Sahara Case.1 9 Because the matter had not simply arisen
disputes subjected to judicial settlement); see also Western Sahara Case, [1975] I.C.J. at 25
1 28-30, 33 (describing Spain's objection to exercise ofjurisdiction because it did not
consent and believed that for ICJ to issue advisory opinion would circumvent principle
that State is not obligated to have its disputes settled before ICJ); Yee, supra note 112, at
384 (explaining that requests should not be granted if to respond to question would
have effect of circumventing principle that State must consent to have its disputes
brought before ICJ).
117. See Western Sahara Case, [1975] I.C.J. at 25, 1 34 (finding that to give response
would not violate principle that States must give consent to have disputes settled be-
cause question arose out of proceedings of General Assembly and did not rise indepen-
dently during bilateral relations); see also Yee, supra note 112, at 385 (noting that ICJ
distinguished Western Sahara Case from Eastern Carelia Case by noting that issue in Western
Sahara Case did not arise out of dispute between two parties or dispute between South
Africa and United Nations).
118. See Construction of a Wall Case, 43 I.L.M. at 1094, 1 13 (separate opinion of
Owada, J.) (citing I.C.J. Reports 1975, p. 25, 1 33) (noting that ICJ should have deter-
mined whether request circumvented principle that State should not have its dispute
submitted to ICJ for settlement without its consent); see also id. at 1060, 11 12-13 (sepa-
rate opinion of Higgins,J.) (noting that ICJ quickly drew analogies between Construction
of a Wall Case and other advisory opinions and ignored relevant details that uniquely
pertained to Construction of a Wall Case and should have addressed with greater scrutiny
whether granting jurisdiction would bypass consent requirement and allow General As-
sembly to later exercise its powers).
119. See Construction of a Wall Case, 43 I.L.M. at 1026, 1 49 (noting that role of
United Nations in Middle East and responsibility for maintenance of international
peace and security make consequences of construction of separation barrier within ju-
risdiction for advisory proceedings); see also S.C. Res. 1269, supra note 7 (encouraging
States to act against international terrorism); S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 7 (calling on
international community to fight against international terrorism and expressing sympa-
thy to victims of September 11th attacks); S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 7 (affirming Secur-
ity Council Resolutions 1269 and 1368 and creating subsidiary body to monitor pro-
gress in fight against terrorism); G.A. Res. 49/60, supra note 7 (stating that acts that
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as part of the bilateral dispute, the ICJ held the General Assem-
bly could properly request advisory proceedings without the con-
sent of the parties.1
21
The ICJ further noted in the Western Sahara Case that a re-
quest for an advisory opinion is improperly made by the General
Assembly if the purpose is that it may later exercise its powers
over that controversy based on the opinion of the ICJ.121 In that
case, the ICJ determined that giving an advisory opinion would
not violate this principle because the General Assembly re-
quested the advisory opinion in order to assist in its decoloniza-
tion of Western Sahara. 122 Unlike the Western Sahara Case, the
subject matter of the Construction of a Wall Case dealt with a mat-
ter that arose during the policy determinations regarding a dis-
pute between the two parties, and the purpose of the request was
to determine the consequences of choices that the General As-
sembly did not participate in making or altering.1 23 The ICJ,
create terror in public are unjustifiable and calling on States to refrain from participa-
tion in organization of such acts); G.A. Res. 51/210, supra note 7 (reiterating position
taken by General Assembly in Resolution 49/60).
120. See Western Sahara Case, [1975] I.C.J. at 24-25, 7 32-34 (stating that General
Assembly could properly make request to ICJ because issue arose out of proceedings of
General Assembly even though parties did not consent); see also Construction of a Wall
Case, 43 I.L.M. at 1025, 47 (explaining that in Western Sahara Case, General Assembly
was able to make request for advisory opinion because question arose during proceed-
ings of General Assembly); id. at 1070, 27 (separate opinion of Kooijmans, J.) (argu-
ing that issues can be both bilateral dispute and community issue, and thus ICJ can
answer question).
121. See Western Sahara Case, [1975] I.C.J. at 26-27, 39 (stating that Spain also
argued that advisory opinion would be outside of judicial character because General
Assembly issued request to ICJ so that it could later use advisory opinion to exercise its
powers over settlement of dispute); see also Construction of a Wall Case, 43 I.L.M. at 1060,
7 12, 13 (separate opinion of Higgins, J.) (noting reservation in Western Sahara Case
that General Assembly should not make request so that it may later act on decision of
ICJ; criticizing that ICJ did not address the issue and positing that ICJ revised case law
on this issue).
122. See Western Sahara Case, [1975] I.C.J. at 26-27, 39 (holding that General As-
sembly could properly request advisory opinion because question regarded proper role
of General Assembly in decolonization of territory); see also Construction of a Wall Case,
43 I.L.M. at 1059-60, 11 (separate opinion of Higgins, J.) (noting that in Western Sa-
hara Case, ICJ determined that consent was not needed to issue advisory opinion regard-
ing proper role of General Assembly in decolonization of non-self-governing territory).
123. See G.A. Res. ES 10/14, supra note 15 (requesting that ICJ give advisory opin-
ion regarding consequences of Israel's plan to build separation barrier between Israel
and OPT); see also Construction of a Wall Case, 43 I.L.M. at 1069, 22 (separate opinion
of Kooijmans, J.) (explaining that ES-10/14 indicates that General Assembly felt need
to take action regarding Israel's decision to construct separation barrier and sought
opinion of ICJ for purpose of taking action against construction of separation barrier).
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however, never addressed this principle. 124
The decision in the Construction of a Wall Case also impacted
the exercise of jurisdiction over a bilateral dispute.12' The ICJ
drew an analogy to the South West Africa Case where the ICJ is-
sued an advisory opinion regarding the impact for the State of
South Africa of the termination of the South African Man-
date. 12 6  Several Judges recognized, however, many subtleties
that made the Construction of a Wall Case very different from the
South West Africa Case.1 27 In the South West Africa Case, the contro-
versy was directly between the United Nations and South Africa,
the request was made with reference to a Security Council deci-
sion, and the General Assembly sought advice on the conse-
quences of its own action.1 28 In the Construction of a Wall Case,
124. See Construction of a Wall Case, 43 I.L.M. at 1060, 13 (separate opinion of
Higgins, J.) (stating that ICJ never addressed principle that requests should not circum-
vent consent and thus revised existing case law); see also id. at 1093-94, 12 (separate
opinion of Owada, J.) (noting that matter appears to be brought to ICJ so that General
Assembly can later exercise its powers for peaceful dispute of controversy, and that
proper test for judicial propriety is whether answering request would be tantamount to
issuing opinion regarding underlying bilateral dispute); id at 1069-70, 9191 22-25 (sepa-
rate opinion of Kooijmans, J.) (concluding that ICJ did not satisfactorily address
whether nature of the question was within judicial character).
125. See Construction of a Wall Case, 43 I.L.M. at 1025, 91 46 (stating that one argu-
ment against exercise of jurisdiction is that question concerns contentious matter be-
tween Israel and Palestine); see also id. at 1059, 911 6-7 (separate opinion of Higgins, J.)
(noting that General Assembly should not get involved in matter between international
parties, and in Construction of a Wall Case ICJ recognized that dispute was between two
international actors); id. at 1091, 1093, 1 2, 10 (separate opinion of Owada, J.) (not-
ing that ICJ should have more closely addressed nature of dispute in its determination
not to exercise discretion).
126. See Construction of a Wall Case, 43 I.L.M. at 1025, 1 48 (stating that while Israel
and Palestine have expressed different views regarding legality of separation barrier, ICJ
noted in South West Africa Case that parties have different views in every advisory pro-
ceeding); see also South West Africa Case, [ 1971] I.C.J 16, 24 91 34 (noting that parties have
had different views in almost every advisory proceeding and that those views do not
prevent ICJ from properly exercising jurisdiction).
127. See Construction of a Wall Case, 43 I.L.M. at 1058, 91 2 (separate opinion of
Higgins, J.) (arguing that ICJ analogized Construction of a Wall Case to South West Africa
Case without addressing many subtleties that make Construction of a Wall Case different);
see also id. at 1093, 91 10 (separate opinion of Owada, J.) (concluding that ICJ did not
examine details of Construction of a Wall Case that distinguish it from previous requests
for advisory opinions, particularly, that ICJ inappropriately likened case to South West
Africa Case).
128. See South West Africa Case, [1971] I.CJ. at 24, 9132 (stating that request was
made by United Nations organ which was seeking advice regarding its own actions in
decolonization of non-self-governing territory); see also Construction of a Wall Case, 43
I.L.M. at 1093, 11 (separate opinion of Owada, J.) (reiterating that ICJ was asked to
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the controversy was between Israel and Palestine.1 29  The ICJ
noted that because of the U.N.'s responsibilities regarding the
maintenance of international peace and security, the construc-
tion of the separation barrier directly concerns the United Na-
tions.'3 Additionally, the U.N. organs have manifested their re-
sponsibility through the adoption of various resolutions and the
creation of subsidiary bodies.1"1 The ICJ then found that be-
cause of these concerns and resolutions, the General Assembly
sought the opinion to assist it in its proper function, therefore,
to give an opinion would not violate principles ofjudicial propri-
ety. 1 3 2
The Construction of a Wall Case also changed the standard of
evidence necessary for advisory proceedings to remain faithful to
judicial character.133 The determinative factor in deciding
render advisory opinion regarding legality of action taken by United Nations in South
West Africa Case).
129. See Construction of a Wall Case, 43 I.L.M. at 1093, 11 (stating that unlike the
South West Africa Case in which the ICJ was asked to render advisory opinion of legal
consequences of action of United Nations organ, Construction of a Wall Case asked ICJ to
make determination regarding consequences of Israeli action with regard to action im-
pacting Palestine); see also id. at 1058-59, 11 1-6 (separate opinion of Higgins, J.) (re-
viewing factual background of two questions and determining that situation presented
in Construction of a Wall Case is much different than one in South West Africa Case).
130. See Construction of a Wall Case, 43 I.L.M. at 1026, 1 49 (concluding that ICJ
does not consider subject matter of request to be simply bilateral because powers and
responsibilities of United Nations for maintenance of international peace and security
make construction of separation barrier direct concern of United Nations); see also id. at
1070, 27 (separate opinion of Kooijmans,J.) (arguing that issues can be both bilateral
dispute and community issue, and thus ICJ can answer question).
131. See Construction of a Wall Case, 43 I.L.M. at 1026, 1 49 (concluding that respon-
sibility has been manifested by adoption of various resolutions regarding situation in
Middle-East and creation of subsidiary bodies to oversee adoption of those resolutions);
see also id. at 1070, 1 27 (separate opinion of Kooijmans, J.) (finding that ICJ can issue
advisory opinion because nature of dispute makes it concern of entire international
community).
132. See Construction of a Wall Case, 43 I.L.M. at 1025, 1 50 (finding that General
Assembly issued request in Construction of a Wall Case to obtain assistance for proper
exercise of its functions and because advisory opinion is related to matter of concern
for United Nations that is part of broader frame of reference than bilateral dispute
between Israel and Palestine and therefore request was proper); see also Summary of Advi-
soy Opinion, supra note 15 (explaining that ICJ found that opinion was requested re-
garding matter of deep concern to United Nations and was asked for advice regarding
General Assembly's proper exercise of functions and was thus proper).
133. See Construction of a Wall Case, 43 I.L.M. at 1026, 55 (observing that partici-
pants in proceedings raised challenge that ICJ did not have evidence necessary to reach
conclusions regarding legal consequences of separation barrier); see also i& at 1078, 1 1
(declaration of Buergenthal, J.) (stating that Judge Buergenthal voted against exercise
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whether the ICJ has the requisite information is whether there is
sufficient evidence to allow the ICJ to arrive at a conclusion on
any judicial fact which may be necessary for the advisory opin-
ion.' In advisory proceedings, the ICJ is not bound simply to
the information provided by the parties.1" 5 Israel relied on the
Peace Treaties Case to allege that the ICJ could not issue an advi-
sory opinion on an issue that raises questions of fact that cannot
be fully understood without evidence provided by all parties to
the conflict.'36 The ICJ however, determined that it could make
a decision based on the amount of information that was
presented to it.' 3 7 Later, however, it stated that it was unable to
conclude that the separation barrier was necessary based on the
information it had.13
8
of jurisdiction in Construction of a Wall Case because he did not believe that ICJ had
requisite facts to make determination).
134. See Construction of a Wall Case, 43 I.L.M. at 1027, 56 (observing that eviden-
tiary standard is that ICJ must have sufficient information to make determination on
any fact that will be relevant to conclusions of advisory opinion); see also Western Sahara
Case, [1975] I.C.J. 12, 28-29, 46 (stating that determinative factor in deciding if ICJ
has requisite information is whether ICJ will be able to arrive at conclusions, compatible
with its judicial character, regarding every fact relevant to dispotif of advisory opinion);
Peace Treaties Case, [1950] I.C.J. 65, 72 (setting standard of evidence necessary that was
later applied in Western Sahara Case and Construction of a Wall Case).
135. See Construction of a Wall Case, 43 I.L.M. at 1096, 20 (separate opinion of
Owada, J.) (stating that in advisory proceedings, ICJ is not bound by materials
presented by parties); see also id. at 1096, 20 (declaration of Buergenthal, J.) (con-
cluding that once Israel did not consent to proceedings, it was improper for ICJ to
make decisions adverse to Israel assuming that it had relevant information without first
determining if ICJ had all relevant information).
136. See Construction of a Wall Case, 43 I.L.M. at 1027, 55 (stating that Israel relied
on Peace Treaties Case and contended that ICJ could not give advisory opinion on matters
which raise questions of fact that cannot be fully understood without evidence
presented by all parties); see also Summary of Advisory Opinion, supra note 15 (reiterating
Israel's objection that for ICJ to give advisory opinion it would have to speculate about
essential facts relevant to question of law).
137. See Construction of a Wall Case, 43 I.L.M. at 1027-28, 1 56-58 (reviewing evi-
dence before ICJ and concluding that evidence is sufficient for ICJ to render advisory
opinion that is in accordance with judicial character); see also id. at 1027, 56-58 (decla-
ration of Buergenthal, J.) (stating that ICJ concluded that it had relevant information
for making determination regarding legal consequences of separation barrier).
138. See Construction of a Wall Case, 43 I.L.M. at 1027, 140 (concluding that, based
on information available, ICJ is not convinced that course of separation barrier was
necessary to achieve security objectives); see also id. at 1080, 7 (declaration of Bu-
ergenthal, J.) (arguing that ICJ reaches conclusion that wall is not necessary to meet
security objectives but does not address any facts relevant to Israel's claim of military
exigency or national security); id. at 1096, 23 (separate opinion of Owada, J.) (argu-
iilg that ICJ's statement that it is not convinced that Israel's strategy was necessary for
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While the nature of the dispute does not require the ICJ to
refuse to issue an opinion, it does call for an extensive inquiry
into judicial propriety. 139 Commentators suggest that the deci-
sion to evade the consent requirement and become involved in a
bilateral dispute expanded the type of matter that can be
brought before the ICJ and changed the role of the ICJ in the
international system."40 The ICJ, however, found no compelling
reasons why it should not exercise its jurisdiction,' and by a
vote of fourteen to one decided to comply with the request.14 2
security objectives is admission by ICJ that it does not have requisite facts to make deter-
mination regarding necessity of security barrier).
139. See Construction of a Wall Case, 43 I.L.M. at 1093-94, 12 (separate opinion of
Owada, J.) (calling for greater inquiry into jurisdictional issues); see also id. at 1058, 2
(separate opinion of Higgins, J.) (stating that choice regarding discretion deserves
more analysis due to difficult nature of decision); id. at 1069-71, 9 19-28 (separate
opinion of Kooijmans, J.) (questioning ICJ's analysis of judicial propriety); Gordon,
supra note 58 (noting that in future, General Assembly will be able to bring any matter
before ICJ by passing resolutions and becoming involved in matter, making dispute not
simply bilateral); McCarthy, supra note 21 (noting that allowing ICJ to become involved
in bilateral disputes allows international community to become involved in dispute be-
cause submissions by non-parties are permitted during advisory proceedings).
140. See Gordon, supra note 58 (noting that ICJ disregarded consent requirement,
one of cardinal protections guaranteed in ICJ Charter); see also Leavitt, supra note 57
(arguing that decision to hear case politicized ICJ); Decision Dismisses Israel's Arguments,
supra note 12 (concluding that ICJ's decision to hear case called status of international
law into question and that Opinion may provide precedent for ICJ to bring sovereign
States before the ICJ and force State to defend policy before ICJ); Press Release GA/
10246, supra note 94 (stating that several States believe decision to hear case improperly
evaded consent requirement and inappropriately politicized ICJ); Wedgewood, supra
note 21 (positing that to allow ICJ to intrude into policy matters of States will affect
international community's perception of different conflicts); McCarthy, supra note 21
(observing that decision to hear case potentially undermines integrity of ICJ and integ-
rity of international law, and decision changes role of ICJ because ICJ allows liberal
submissions by non-parties during advisory proceedings, allowing all nations to become
involved in addressing policy determinations of other States); Comments on White Pa-
per, supra note 21 (noting potential effect on international law and that allowing ICJ to
become involved in matters between States engages entire international community be-
cause in advisory proceedings submissions are allowed by non-parties); Greg Rose, UN
Court Clouds Better Judgment; AUSTR. FIN. REV., July 13, 2004, available at 2004 WL
79461222 (remarking that decision to hear case turned ICJ into executive agency of
General Assembly).
141. See Construction of a Wall Case, 43 I.L.M. at 1029, 65 (finding that ICJ found
no compelling reason not to comply with request); see also Summary of Advisory Opinion,
supra note 15 (noting that ICJ concluded that there was no compelling reason why it
should decline jurisdiction).
142. See Construction of a Wall Case, 43 I.L.M. at 1054, 163(2) (stating that ICJ, by
a vote of 14 to 1, decided to comply with request for Advisory Opinion); see also Press
Release, Hague Decision on Security Fence "Shocking"; ADL says Israel Never Stood a
Chance to Defend Itself, (July 9, 2004), available at http://www.adl.org/PresRele/
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OnJuly 9, 2004, the ICJ rendered its Advisory Opinion regarding
the legal consequences of the construction of the separation bar-
rier in the OPT. 4
B. A New Interpretation of the Right to Self Defense
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter allows a State to act in de-
fense of its citizens without the permission of the Security Coun-
cil.' 4 4 The text of Article 51 has traditionally been interpreted to
carry several requirements including: (1) that the State have
been subjected to an armed attack; (2) that the response of the
State must be proportional to the threat posed; and (3) that a
State must have exhausted all practical means of preventing the
attack. 4 5 A further issue in the application of Article 51 con-
cerns the origin of the attack.'46
There is little authority on what constitutes an armed at-
tack.'4 7 Some scholars argue that because of the evolution of
IslME_62/4530_62.htm (noting potential changes in international law based on ICJ's
decision).
143. See Construction of a Wall Case, 43 I.L.M. 1009 (announcing date that opinion
was rendered); see also Press Release 2004/23, Court Will Render its Advisory Opinion
on Friday 9 July 2004, at 3 p.m., (June 25, 2004), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/
icjwww/idocket/imwp/imwpframe.htm [hereinafter Press Release 2004/23] (announc-
ing date and time that ICJ would render opinion); Press Release 2004/28, supra note 95
(announcing that ICJ rendered its opinion and found separation barrier violated inter-
national law).
144. See U.N. CHARTER art. 51 (stating in relevant part that nothing in Charter shall
impair right of self-defense if armed attack occurs against Member State); see also Kas-
tenberg, supra note 2, at 107 (explaining that Article 51 of U.N. Charter enshrines in-
herent right of self-defense for Members of United Nations); Construction of a Wall Case,
43 I.L.M. at 1049-50, 91 138-39 (noting potential relevance of principle of self-defense
but noting that principle does not apply to case at bar).
145. See Saura, supra note 2, at 24 (recalling that act can only be justified by princi-
ple of self-defense if it satisfies conditions of immediateness, necessity, and proportion-
ality); see also John Alan Cohan, The Bush Doctrine and the Emerging Norm of Anticpatory
Self-Defense in Customary International Law, 15 PACE INT'L L. REv. 283, 314 (2003) (argu-
ing that right to self defense is limited to instances of armed attack against State) [here-
inafter Cohan, Bush Doctrine]; Walker, supra note 63, at 522 (stating that necessity and
proportionality are basic elements of self-defense response); Kastenberg, supra note 2,
at 108-09 (explaining that while no definition of self-defense was provided in U.N.
Charter, ICJ provided some explanation in Nicaragua Case).
146. See Kastenberg, supra note 2, at 108 (noting that no international convention
interprets or defines requirements of Article 51 of U.N. Charter but that there have
been many interpretations of its requirements); see also King, supra note 1, at 461 (dis-
cussing that while the ICJ noted in Nicaragua Case that armed attack must come from
State, other interpretations suggest that there is no such requirement in Article 51 of
U.N. Charter).
147. See King, supra note 1, at 461 (explaining that there has been debate concern-
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modern warfare and the grave threat posed by nuclear and bio-
logical weapons, States no longer have to wait until an actual
armed attack occurs. 148 However, the ICJ, in Nicaragua v. United
States of America ("Nicargua Case") adopted a very strict interpreta-
tion of armed attack and held that merely assisting rebels did not
constitute a threat posed by the State. 49 The ICJ held that the
behavior of Nicaragua, while an unlawful use of force, did not
constitute an armed attack under Article 2(4) of the U.N. Char-
ter.150 Furthermore, it stated that in determining if an act con-
stituted an armed attack, it is necessary to make a distinction
between the gravest uses of force and other less severe forms. 51
Although the acts in that case did not constitute an attack, the
ICJ did recognize that the sending of armed groups into another
ing what actually constitutes armed attack); see also Beard, supra note 61, at 567 (con-
cluding that while U.N. Charter provides that States can act on inherent right to self-
defense, requirements of self-defense, particularly of what constitutes and armed attack,
have been debated); Murphy, Terrorism and the Concept of Armed Attack, supra 66, at 44
(observing that while all agree that there is right to act in self-defense regarding in
response to armed attack, courts have not defined what constitutes armed attack).
148. See Cohan, Bush Doctrine, supra note 145, at 316 (explaining that because of
modern developments in warfare, scholars suggest that State would not have to wait
until an actual attack occurs to act in self-defense); see also Walker, supra note 63, at 522-
23 (noting that anticipatory self-defense is not an issue because in time of information
warfare threat from weapons of mass destruction makes debate regarding anticipatory
self-defense moot).
149. See Cohan, Bush Doctrine, supra note 145, at 317 (stating that ICJ's narrow view
of armed attack in Nicaragua Case led ICJ to conclude that assistance to rebels did not
constitute armed attack and thus the United States could not act against government of
Nicaragua in self-defense); see also Kastenberg, supra note 2, at 110 (arguing that in ICJ's
decision in Nicaragua Case, ICJ never mentioned any relevant aspect of sovereignty).
150. See Nicaragua Case, [1986] I.CJ. 14, 110-11, 1 211 (holding that States do not
have right to act in self-defense unless they have been victim of armed attack); see also
U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 1 4 (providing that States shall refrain from the use of force in
their international relations ); Harvey Rishikof, When Naked Came the Doctrine of "Self-
Defense". What is the Proper Role of the International Court ofJustice in Use of Force Cases, 29
YALE J. INT'L L. 331, 338 (2004) (explaining that ICJ found that self-defense was not
relevant justification for U.S. action against Nicaragua because actions of Nicaraguan
Government in assisting Contras did not constitute armed attack under Article 2(4) of
U.N. Charter); Kastenberg, supra note 2, at 109 (noting that ICJ held in Nicaragua Case
that States could not justifiably act in self-defense unless event State is responding to
constitutes armed attack).
151. See Nicaragua Case, [1986] I.C.J. at 101,91 191 (stating that gravest uses of force
constitute armed attack, while less severe actions are merely violations of U.N. Charter);
see also Oil Platforms Case, 1 51, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iop/
iopjudgment/iop -judgment-20031106.PDF (describing holding of Nicaragua Case and
noting importance of determining whether attack constituted use of force of gravest
form); Murphy, Terrorism and the Concept of Armed Attack, sup-a note 66, at 45 (comment-
ing that in determining if act constitutes armed attack, must consider scale of actions).
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State could constitute an armed attack.152
In the Oil Platforms Case, the ICJ reviewed the U.S. armed
attack on three offshore oil platforms that were operated by the
National Iranian Oil Company.1" The United States justified its
use of force under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, alleging that
Iran attacked a U.S. ship. 154 The ICJ stated that it would review
the actions of the United States within its understanding that a
State is prohibited from using force against another and the
qualification that a State is permitted to exercise the right of self-
defense.155 Furthermore, the ICJ announced that for the United
States to use the self-defense justification, the attacks to which it
responded must have constituted an armed attack within the
meaning of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, and as understood by
the international customary law.156 The international commu-
152. See Murphy, Terrorism and the Concept of Armed Attack, supra note 66, at 51 (ex-
plaining that in Nicaragua Case, ICJ associated armed attack with idea of military action,
but did acknowledge idea that attacks could arise in other ways such as sending armed
groups into another State); see also Glennon, supra note 25, at 541-42 (observing that
while ICJ found that Nicaragua's assistance did not constitute armed attack, support or
sending armed bands into another State would constitute armed attack).
153. See Oil Platforms Case, 1, 25, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/
idocket/iop/iopudgment/iop -judgment_20031106.PDF (stating that Government of
Islamic Republic of Iran filed application instituting proceedings against United States
regarding dispute over armed attack of three offshore oil platforms and reporting that
United States justified attacks by stating that it was acting in self-defense); see also Stew-
art M. Young, Destruction of Property (on an International Scale): the Recent Oil Platforms Case
and the International Court ofJustice's Inconsistent Commentary on the Use of Force by the United
States, 30 N.C. J. INT'L L. & Com. REG. 335, 337 (2004), (observing that in 2003, ICJ
finally gave opinion in contentious matter involving U.S. force against two Iranian off-
shore oil platforms and an oil complex in 1987 and 1988).
154. See Oil Platforms Case, 1 25, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/
iop/iopjudgment/iop-ijudgment_20031106.PDF (stating that United States attributed
attack against Kuwaiti ship Sea Isle City, ship that was reflagged to United States, to Iran
and attacked offshore Iranian installations claiming self-defense); see also Young, supra
note 153, at 345-46 (explaining that United States attacked Iranian platforms in re-
sponse to attacks against tankers and under justification of self-defense).
155. See Oil Platforms Case, 43, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/
iop/iopjudgment/iop ijudgment_20031106.PDF (stating that ICJ would have to review
action in light of prohibition against use of force and qualification that States are per-
mitted to act in self-defense); see also Young, supra note 153, at 353 (explaining that ICJ
stated it would review actions of United States by considering principle that States are
prohibited from using force against other States and principle that State has right to act
in self-defense).
156. See Oil Platforms Case, 51, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/
iop/iopjudgment/iop ijudgment_20031106.PDF (concluding that for United States to
show that it was legally justified in its use of force, had to show that attacks attributed to
Iran constituted armed attack within meaning of Article 51 of U.N. Charter and as
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nity has indicated, in the wake of the September 11 th attacks,
that terrorist strikes constitute an armed attack. 15
7
In the Oil Platforms Case the ICJ addressed whether a series
of attacks would constitute an armed attack for the purposes of
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.55 The ICJ found that the series
of attacks that the United States attributed to Iran did not consti-
tute an armed attack because they could not be considered one
of the gravest forms of the use of force. 59 In the past, the inter-
national community criticized assertions that terrorist attacks
understood in customary international law); see also Young, supra note 153, at 354 (ex-
plaining that in Oil Platforms case, ICJ held that United States could only use justifica-
tion of self-defense is actions it was responding to could be attributed to armed attack as
was understood in both U.N. Charter and international customary law).
157. See Antonio Cassese, Terrorism is Also Disrupting Some Crucial Legal Categories of
International Law, 12 EUR. J. INT'L L. 993, 996-97, (2001) (arguing that international
acceptance of United State's use of force in response to September 1 th attacks assimi-
lated attacks by terrorist organization to armed attack by another State); see also Ian
Johnstone, The US-UN Relations After Iraq: the End of the World (Order) as We Know it?, 15
EUR. J. INT'L L. 813, 829 (2004) (explaining that almost all States came to agree that
attacks by terrorist organizations constitute armed attack that would merit self-defense
justification for use of force); Guillaume, supra note 66, at 546 (noting that majority of
authors treat acts of terrorism reaching extent and gravity of September 11 th attacks as
constituting armed attack); Stahn, supra note 1, at 37 (concluding that there is almost
unanimous recognition that acts of terrorism fit within parameters of Article 51 of U.N.
Charter, even if they are carried out by independent actors); Murphy, Terrorism and the
Concept of Armed Attack, supra note 66, at 47-48 (concluding that September 11 th attacks
constituted an armed attack because of scale of attacks, because United States perceived
incidents as being same as military attack, and because interpretation that incidents
constituted armed attack was accepted by other States); Jose E. Alvarez, The UN's "War"
on Terrorism, 31 INT'L J. LEGAL INFO. 238, 243 (2004) (stating that Security Councils'
response after United States initiated war in Afghanistan indicates that terrorist vio-
lence of scale it reached during September 11th attacks constitutes armed attack).
158. See Oil Platforms Case, 64, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/
iop/iopjudgment/iopjjudgment_20031106.PDF (stating that ICJ would examine U.S.
claim that series of incidents constituted armed attack for purposes of Article 51 of U.N.
Charter); see also Young, supra note 153, at 365-66 (observing that ICJ addressed claim
that series of attacks made the Gulf unsafe but concluded that United States did not
provide sufficient evidence to prove that attacks created impediment to trade and navi-
gation, and concluding that ICJ did not engage in same analysis of U.S. claims as it did
of Iranian claims, indicating that holding was politically commentary that deviated from
principles of international law).
159. See Oil Platforms Case, 51, 64, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/
idocket/iop/iopjudgment/iop -judgment-20031106.PDF (stating that series of attacks
did not constitute armed attack because it did not satisfy requirement set forth in Nica-
ragua Case that use of force must be of most grave form to constitute armed attack); see
also Nicaragua Case, [1986] I.C.J. 14, 101, 1 191 (concluding that in determining if State
has been subject to armed attack it is necessary to determine if attack was use of grave
force).
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met the level of an armed attack.160 However, the international
community did not condemn the use of force in response to the
September 11 th attacks, the final in a series of attacks attributed
to al Qaeda, indicating that the acts were grave enough to consti-
tute an armed attack.1 61
Further, the ICJ has held that a State using self-defense to
justify its actions against another State must prove that its actions
were necessary and proportional to the threat posed to it. 16 2
These principles only require that the kinds of force used are
those necessary for subduing the enemy, without employing ex-
160. See Murphy, Terrorism and the Concept of Armed Attack, supra note 66, at 46 (ob-
serving that in past, international community had not accepted self-defense asjustifica-
tion for use of force in response to terrorist attacks because actions did not constitute
armed attack); see also Beard, supra note 61, at 562-65 (remarking that past military
action against terrorist attacks had received varying responses from international com-
munity partly because international community was not convinced strikes against
United States were extensive enough to constitute armed attack).
161. See Oil Platforms Case, 1 51, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/
iop/iopjudgment/iop ijudgment_20031106.PDF (noting that series of attacks will only
be considered armed attack if is grave use of force); see also Nicaragua Case, [1986] I.C.J.
at 101, 191 (concluding that must distinguish between use of force and grave use of
force when determining if armed attack occurred); S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 7 (con-
demning September 11 th attacks and recognizing need for international community to
fight against international terrorism); S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 7 (affirming Security
Council Resolutions 1269 and 1368 and creating subsidiary body to monitor progress in
fight against terrorism); Murphy, Terrorism and the Concept of Armed Attack, supra note 66,
at 47 (observing that use of force in September 11 th attacks was grave use of force and
that international community accepted this interpretation, which was demonstrated
through support given to Operation Enduring Freedom); Stahn, supra note 1, at 36
(concluding that force of September 11th attacks was of greater magnitude than other
terrorist strike); King, supra note 1, at 471 (finding that threat of additional attacks of
magnitude of September 11 th attacks has changed way that international law is used
and interpreted because demonstrated the enormity of terrorist capabilities); Beard,
supra note 61, at 574-75 (remarking strikes constitute armed attack because caused ex-
tensive loss of life and severe damage to property).
162. See Oil Platforms Case, 11 51, 74, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/
idocket/iop/iopjudgment/iopjjudgment_20031106.PDF (explaining that lawfulness
of response to armed attack depends on whether response was necessary and propor-
tional); see also Nicaragua Case, [1986] I.C.J. at 94, 103, 1 176, 194 (holding that whether
response to armed attack is lawful depends on States observance of requirements of
necessity and proportionality and that those two conditions originate in customary in-
ternational law); Nuclear Weapons Case, [1996] I.C.J. 226, 245, 1 41 (stating that condi-
tions of proportionality and necessity imposed on exercise of right of self-defense come
from customary international law); Rishikof, supra note 150, at 333 (explaining that ICJ
found in Oil Platforms Case that United States had not carried its burden in proving
that its actions were necessary and proportionate to threat posed and thus could not
rely on self-defense to justify actions); Feinstein, supra note 1, at 78 (stating that State's
exercise of self-defense can not be excessive or unreasonable).
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cessive force, and while minimizing the number of deaths and
drain on physical resources.1 63 In the Oil Platforms Case, the ICJ
stated that the principle of necessity is objective and looked at
the Nicaragua Case for guidance in deciding that the United
States was not justified in attacks against the oil platforms be-
cause they were not a necessary action.1 6 4 According to the ICJ,
relevant information would include the nature of the target of
operation, evidence that the United States had complained of
the threats posed in the past, and proof that the target had previ-
ously been identified as a military target.165 The ICJ also con-
163. See Walker, supra note 63, at 526 (explaining that principle of necessity in-
volves the degree and amount of force required for partial or complete subduing of
enemy with limited expenditure of life, physical resources, and time, while proportion-
ality principle prohibits use of any kind or degree of force not required for submission
of enemy with minimum toll on life, time, and physical resources); see also Schmitt,
Assessment, supra note 1, at 753 (acknowledging that principle of proportionality limits
force that can be used, but arguing that given the financial nature of terrorist and the
egregious nature of weapons of mass destruction, it is difficult to imagine strike that
would be disproportionate); Schmitt, Preemptive Strategies, supra note 76, at 532-33 (ob-
serving that necessity requires that all reasonable alternatives have been exhausted and
that proportionality limits action to acts necessary to defeat ongoing attack or deter
future attacks, and concluding that while scope of Operation Enduring Freedom was
much larger than that of attacks against United States, operation was proportional need
to deny al Qaeda sanctuary in Afghanistan); King, supra note 1, at 466-67 (noting that
while some argue immediacy is element of necessity, it is not necessary when attack is
part of ongoing campaign); Beard, supra note 61, at 574-75 (noting that magnitude of
September 11th attacks was greater than any previous attack and that it was part of
sustained and continuous attack against United States and concluding that because mil-
itary operations were tailored to minimize civilian casualties and because of important
objective of eliminating threat of international terrorism, military force satisfies require-
ment of proportionality). But see Saura, supra note 2, at 25 (arguing that intensity of
Operation Enduring Freedom and fact that operation sought to overthrow government
make action inconsistent with concept of proportionality).
164. See Oil Platforms Case, 76, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/
iop/iopjudgmnent/iopijudgment_20031106.PDF (holding that United States did not
prove that it was necessary to respond to Iranian attacks and stating that there was no
evidence that United States had previously complained of military activity on the plat-
forms); see also Young, supra note 153, at 359-60 (explaining that while United States
provided evidence regarding the threat posed by targets it attacked, ICJ found that
actions taken by United States were not necessary based on threat posed).
165. See Oil Platforms Case 76, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/
iop/iopjudgment/iop -judgment-20031106.PDF (concluding that United States did
not prove that military operations were necessary because it did not provide enough
information regarding military presence on oil platforms, the United States did not
make complaints to Government of Iran regarding military presence on platforms, and
because United States had not previously identified platforms as military targets); see
also Beard, supra note 61, at 587-88 (stating that facts surrounding use of force in Oper-
ation Enduring Freedom indicate that action was necessary because was response to
ongoing campaign against the United States by group whose leaders have stated that
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cluded, in the Oil Platforms Case, that the actions of the United
States were not proportional to the threat posed. 166 In its discus-
sions, however, the ICJ never announced clear principles that
could be used in addressing the necessity and proportionality of
military action."'
The text of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter does not require
that the armed attack must originate from any particular type of
actor.168 Many look at the text to indicate that an armed attack
does not have to be attributed to a State for another to invoke
the protections of Article 51.169 On this point, many look at in-
they will continue until America is destroyed); King, supra note 1, at 466-69 (noting that
while some believe that immediacy is essential component of necessity, fact that United
States was acting in response to ongoing campaign would satisfy necessity requirement).
166. See Oil Platforms Case, 77, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/
iop/iopjudgment/iop-ijudgment.20031106.PDF (briefly addressing requirement of
proportionality and finding that action was not proportionate because mining of single
U.S. warship did not merit initiation of military operation); see also Young, supra note
153, at 358-59 (observing that ICJ found that response was not proportional because
was not convinced that it was necessary).
167. See Oil Platforms Case, 77, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/
iop/iopjudgment/iop-ijudgment.20031106.PDF (concluding that U.S. action was not
proportional because attack that damaged, rather than destroyed, single U.S. warship,
did not merit entire military operation); see also Young, supra note 153, at 360-61 (ex-
plaining that while ICJ found that US action was neither necessary nor proportionate, it
never articulated principles that could be used for addressing the necessity or propor-
tionality of future action); Rishikof, supra note 150, at 332 (observing that ICJ's ruling
in Oil Platforms case was formalistic and disconnected and did little to elucidate princi-
ples of self-defense).
168. See U.N. CHARTER art. 51 (stating that nothing in Charter shall affect inherent
right of State to act in self-defense so long as it does not interfere with actions of Secur-
ity Council); see also Construction of a Wall Case, 43 I.L.M. 1009, 1063, 33 (July 9, 2004)
(separate opinion of Higgins, J.) (noting that nothing in text of Article 51 of U.N.
Charter requires that attack be attributed to another State, but instead that require-
ment was result of interpretation in Nicaragua Case); Stahn, supra note 1, at 42 (explain-
ing that nothing in the text of Article 51 of U.N. Charter requires that armed attack be
attributed to State for another State to invoke the inherent right to self-defense); Paust,
supra note 13, 534 (observing that there is agreement that armed attack is prerequisite
for use of self-defense but that nothing requires that armed attack be attributed to
State); Feinstein, supra note 1, at 67-68 (stating that noting in U.N. Charter requires
that armed attack can only originate with State and arguing that Article 51 of U.N.
Charter was drafted in manner broad enough to permit use of force in self-defense
against non-State actors).
169. See Murphy, Terrorism and the Concept of Armed Attack, supra note 66, at 50 (ar-
guing that nothing in text of Article 51 of U.N. Charter requires that act be attributed
to State in order for action in self-defense to be justified, and that because U.N. Charter
preserves inherent right to self-defense, it preserves right to respond to attacks wher-
ever they come from); see also Beard, supra note 61, at 567 (noting that in analyzing use
of Article 51 of U.N. Charter, many look towards reference to inherent right to self-
defense in Article 51 of U.N. Charter); Leo Von den hole, Anticipatoy Self-Defence Under
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ternational custom and note that the North Atlantic Treaty Or-
ganization ("NATO"), the Organization of American States
("OAS") and the United Nations supported the response to the
September 11 th attacks, and argue that this supports the conclu-
sion that the acts do not have to be attributed to a State in order
to merit action in self-defense. 170 On the other hand, some com-
mentators, suggest that an armed attack must come from a State
in order for another State to justify the use of force in re-
sponse. 171
In the Construction of a Wall Case the ICJ took the latter
stance and held that Israel could not use the threat of terrorist
attacks emanating from the OPT to justify its plan to build the
separation barrier because the attacks were not attributed to a
State. 72 This interpretation came from the ICJ's previous hold-
International Law, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REV 69, 79-81 (2003) (concluding that precondi-
tions of exercise of right to self-defense stated in Article 51 of U.N. Charter are pur-
posely vague, indicating framers intent to maintain customary right as opposed to statu-
tory right); Stahn, supra note 1, at 36 (observing that framers of U.N. Charter drafted
Article 51 of U.N. Charter broadly enough to allow for use of self-defense against acts
emanating from non-State actors).
170. See Guillame, supra note 66, at 546 (noting that there is debate regarding
whether terrorist attacks must be attributed to State in order to justify use of force
under Article 51 of U.N. charter and that many point to international support of
United States action to indicate that Article 51 of U.N. Charter does not require that
acts be attributed to State in order for use of force to be permitted); see alsoJohnstone,
supra note 157, at 828 (explaining that international community supported claim that
United States had been subject to armed attack during strikes against it on September
11, 2001); Stahn, supra note 1, at 37 (stating that near unanimous official recognition
exists that terrorism carried out by private actors fits within parameters of Article 51 of
U.N. Charter); Schmitt, Preemptive Strategies, supra note 76, 536-39 (observing that NATO
and OAS and Australia, Canada, the Czech Republic, Georgia, Italy, Japan, the Nether-
lands, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, the Philippines, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
South Korea, Tajikistan, Turkey, Uzbekistan, and United Kingdom all provided support
to Operation Enduring Freedom, indicating that States apply law of self-defense to acts
perpetrated by non-State actors).
171. See Construction of a Wall Case, 43 I.L.M. 1009, 1049-50, 139 (July 9, 2004)
(stating that armed attack must be attributed to State in order for exception to prohibi-
tion of use of force to apply); see also Guillame, supra note 66, at 546 (noting that many
authors suggest that while attacks by terrorist organizations that reach level of gravity of
September 11th attacks are seen by many as armed attacks, such attacks might need to
be attributed to State in order for another State to be justified under Article 51 of U.N.
Charter to use force); Schmitt, Preemptive Strategies, supra note 76, at 536 (observing that
some commentators suggest that law of self-defense assumes that attack was perpetrated
by another State).
172. See Construction of a Wall Case, 43 I.L.M. at 1049-50, 139 (finding that Israel
can not use self-defense to justify its actions because attacks can not be attributed to
State and that Resolutions 1368 and 1373 do not apply because Israel exercise control
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ing in the Nicaragua Case.'71 In that case, the ICJ held that in
order for a State to be held accountable for the actions of armed
groups, there must be evidence proving that the State directed
or enforced the commission of those acts. 1 7 4
Additionally, Article 38 of the ICJ Statute states that the ICJ
shall apply international custom as evidence of generally ac-
cepted international law in exercising its proper function. 175
Since 1945, the year in which the U.N. Charter was adopted, the
nature of war has changed, and the threats posed to States are
over OPT and thus situation is different from one contemplated in those resolutions
because the attacks originated in area not controlled by United States); see also id. at
1063, 1 33 (separate opinion of Higgins, J.) (noting that nothing in text of Article 51 of
U.N. Charter requires that attack come from another State, rather it is result of another
ICJ determination in Nicaragua Case); id. at 1072, 1 35 (July 9, 2004) (separate opinion
of Kooijmans, J.) (concluding that Security Council Resolution 1368 and 1373 recog-
nized new right of self-defense and that ICJ bypassed new element of international law,
implications of which were yet to be determined, but concluded that provisions were
not actually relevant because acts were not international acts but originated from terri-
tory controlled by Israel).
173. See Construction of a Wall Case, 43 I.L.M. at 1063, 1 33 (separate opinion of
Higgins, J.) (noting that nothing in text of Article 51 of U.N. Charter requires that
attack come from another State, rather it is result of another ICJ determination in Nica-
ragua Case); see also id. at 1072, 11 35-36 (separate opinion of Kooijmans, J.) (finding
that Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373 recognized new right of self-defense
and that ICJ bypassed new element of international law, implications of which were yet
to be determined, but concluded that provisions weren't actually relevant because acts
were not international acts but originated from territory controlled by Israel).
174. See Nicaragua Case, [1986] I.CJ. 14, 64-65, 115 (holding that for United
States to justifiably act in self-defense against Nicaragua, it must provide evidence that
any Government assisted in orchestration of attacks); see also Feinstein, supra note 1, at
68-69 (explaining that in Nicaragua Case, ICJ ruled that for State to be legally accounta-
ble for actions of armed groups, evidence must support conclusion that it assisted in
organization or commission of attacks).
175. See Statute of the I.C.J., art. 38 (stating that international custom is evidence
of generally-accepted law and should be used by ICJ in exercise of its function of deter-
mining disputes in accordance with international law); see also Nicaragua Case, [1986]
I.C.J. at 194, 1 176 (holding that whether response to armed attack is lawful depends on
State's observance of requirements of necessity and proportionality and that those two
conditions originate in customary international law); Nuclear Weapons Case, [1996] I.C.J.
226, 245, 41 (stating that conditions of proportionality and necessity imposed on
exercise of right of self-defense come from customary international law); Cohan, Bush
Doctrine, supra note 145, at 292 (concluding that ICJ ranks international custom as
source of accepted international law second to use of treaties); King, supra note 1, at
471 (concluding that threat of attacks such as those that occurred on September 11th
has changed way that international law is used and interpreted because demonstrated
enormity of terrorist capabilities). But see Saura, supra note 2, at 25 (observing that
Operation Enduring Freedom was launched almost one month after September 11 th
attacks and thus were not necessary to prevent immediate threat).
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no longer the same as those that the framers contemplated.' 76
Recently, the international community has become more aware
of the threat posed by terrorism. 77 General Assembly Resolu-
tion 49/60 was passed by the General Assembly in 1994 which
adopted the Declaration to Eliminate International Terror-
ism. 178 Additionally, Resolution 1269 was passed by the Security
Council in 1999.179 It condemned all acts of terrorism, regard-
less of their origin and stated that they pose a threat to interna-
tional peace and security.1 80 Furthermore, NATO, the OAS, and
the United Nations supported the response to the September
11 th attacks, indicating that there is international consensus that
self-defense can justifiably be used in response to acts of terrorist
organizations. 
81
176. See Saura, supra note 2, at 8 (noting that international community has become
more aware of threat posed by terrorism since the 1960's); see also Sadat, supra note 2, at
139 (stating that international leaders believe that threat of international terrorism will
grow in importance in future); Philpott, supra note 2, 982 (explaining that religion has
become important in international politics and that non-State actors cause conflicts
that take heaviest toll on sovereign States); Kastenberg, supra note 2, at 105 (concluding
that while international law regarding use of force was originally designed to regulate
interstate warfare to protect civilians from atrocities of war, law should be applied to
terrorist attacks as well because such acts should not be tolerated when there is existing
framework to review illegal acts).
177. See Saura, supra note 2, at 8 (noting that international community has become
more aware of threat posed by terrorism since the 1960's); see also Sadat, supra note 2, at
139 (stating that international leaders believe that threat of international terrorism will
grow in future).
178. See G.A. Res. 49/60, supra note 7 (declaring that General Assembly was dedi-
cated to eradicating all acts of international terrorism); see also Feinstein, supra note 1,
at 62-63 (noting that General Assembly adopted Resolution 49/60 which adopted Dec-
laration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism in which General Assembly
stated that acts of international terrorism threaten security of all States); Sadat, supra
note 2, at 149, 149 nn. 42-43 (stating that General Assembly has indicated willingness to
address threats posed by international terrorists, position it adopted in Declaration on
Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism).
179. See S.C. Res. 1269, supra note 7 (condemning acts of international terrorism);
see alsoSaura, supra note 2, at 16 (stating that Security Council passed Resolution 1269 in
1999, which recognized threat posed by international terrorism).
180. See S.C. Res. 1269, supra note 7 (stating that acts of international terrorism
pose threat to international peace and security); see also Saura, supra note 2, at 16 (ex-
plaining that Security Council Resolution 1269 viewed international terrorism as new
threat to peace and security, but that resolution was adopted without specific reference
to any case).
181. See Guillame, supra note 66, at 546 (noting that there is debate regarding
whether terrorist attacks must be attributed to State in order to justify use of force
under Article 51 of U.N. Charter and that many point to international support of
United States action to indicate that Article 51 of U.N. Charter does not require that
acts be attributed to State for use of force to be permitted); see alsoJohnstone, supra
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The United Nations applied the principle of self-defense
against acts of international terrorism in response to terrorist at-
tacks against the United States.1 12 Security Council Resolution
1368, adopted immediately after the September 11th attacks,
condemned the incidents and stated that the attacks, like any act
of international terrorism, threatened international peace and
security. 8 3 Additionally, Security Council Resolution 1373 af-
firmed the need for international cooperation against terrorism
and the inherent right to self-defense."4 In reaffirming the
right of self-defense in the preambles of both of the Resolutions,
the Security Council indicated that the United States had been
the victim of an armed attack.185  Both of these Resolutions
note 157, at 829 (explaining that international community supported claim that United
States had been subject to armed attack during the September llth attacks); Stahn,
supra note 1, at 37 (stating that near unanimous official recognition exists that terror-
ism carried out by private actors fits within parameters of Article 51 of U.N. Charter);
Schmitt, Preemptive Strategies, supra note 76, at 536-39 (observing that NATO and OAS
and Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Georgia, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zea-
land, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Philippines, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Tajikis-
tan, Turkey, Uzbekistan and United Kingdom all provided support to Operation Endur-
ing Freedom indicating that States apply law of self-defense to acts perpetrated by non-
State actors).
182. See S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 7 (finding that acts of terrorists threaten inter-
national peace and security, recognizing need to combat international terrorism, af-
firming right to act against threats of terrorism, and calling on States to suppress terror-
ist acts); see also S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 7 (calling on international community to
strengthen efforts to combat terrorist activities); Construction of a Wall Case, 43 I.L.M.
1009, 1072, 1 35 (July 9, 2004) (separate opinion of Kooijmans,J.) (noting that Security
Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373 recognize need to combat international terrorism
but make no mention of requirement that act be by one State against another); Lubet,
supra note 19 (noting that logic of ICJ in Advisory Opinion would indicate that United
States would not be justified in acting against al Qaeda, but that action was permitted by
Security Council in resolutions 1368 and 1373); New U.N. Assault, supra note 20 (noting
that ICJ advisory opinion had potential to challenge justifications used by United States
in entering War on Terror).
183. See S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 7 (calling on international community to
strengthen efforts to combat terrorist activities); see also Saura, supra note 2, at 19 (not-
ing that Security Council Resolution 1368 condemned attacks against United States as
acts of international terrorism that threaten international peace and security).
184. See S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 7 (calling on international community to fight
against international terrorism and condemning September 11th attacks); see also
Saura, supra note 2, at 19 (arguing that while Security Council Resolution 1373 reaf-
firmed need for cooperation in fight against international terrorism and affirmed right
to self-defense there is no link to September 11th attacks or any other act of aggres-
sion).
185. See S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 7, at preamble (condemning September 11th
attacks, affirming right to act in self-defense and calling on international community to
fight against international terrorism); see also S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 7, at preamble
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make reference to Resolution 1269, linking the right to act in
self-defense to the necessity of suppressing terrorist acts regard-
less of who commits them.18 6 Commentators suggest that these
resolutions indicate that the use of force against terrorist organi-
zations is permitted by the U.N. Charter.18
7
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW PRECEDENT
Despite the international community's view on terrorism
and the right to defend against acts of terrorism, the ICJ's recent
decision in the Construction of a Wall Case significantly impacts
the War on Terror.' First, the ICJ may now bypass any jurisdic-
tional questions regarding consent, a bilateral dispute, or lack of
(reiterating principles expressed in Resolution 1368 and creating a body to oversee
fight against international terrorism); Johnstone, supra 157, at 828 (explaining that Se-
curity Council supported claim that United States had been victim of armed attack on
September 11, 2003 by affirming right to self-defense in preambular paragraphs of Se-
curity Council Resolutions 1378 and 1373); Beard, supra note 61, at 568 (concluding
that September 11th attacks constitute armed attack implicit in U.N. Security Council's
affirmation of right to self-defense in Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373).
186. See S.C. Res. 1269, supra note 7 (stating that Security Council finds that inter-
national terrorism poses threat to international peace and security and that it is dedi-
cated to fight against international terrorism); see also S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 7 (con-
demning September 11th attacks, affirming right of self-defense found in Article 51 of
U.N. Charter and reiterating principles of Resolution 1269); S.C. Res. 1373, supra note
7 (reaffirming Resolutions 1269 and 1368 and creating subsidiary body to oversee fight
against international terrorism).
187. See Feinstein, supra note 1, at 72 (explaining that Security Council Resolutions
1368 and 1373 indicate that self-defense is proper justification for use of force against
terrorist organizations because Security Council affirmed right of self-defense under
U.N. Charter at same time that it stated that acts of international terrorism pose threat
to peace and security); see also Malvina Halberstam, The U.S. Right to Use Force in Response
to the Attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center, 11 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L.
851, 863 (2004) (arguing that there would be no reason for Security Council to make
reference to self-defense in Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373 if it did not
consider principle relevant to threats posed by international terrorism); Schmitt, Assess-
ment, supra note 1, at 748 (acknowledging that because no one suggested that State was
behind attacks against United States on September 11, 2003, Security Council, in adopt-
ing Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373 was implicitly acknowledging accepta-
bility under principle of self-defense of use of force against terrorists). But see Saura,
supra note 2, at 19 (arguing that while Security Council Resolution affirmed need for
cooperation in fight against international terrorism, nothing in resolution linked rights
given to past acts of terrorism against United States).
188. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text (arguing that ICJ's decision in
Construction of a Wall Case affected War on Terrorism because it allows ICJ to become
involved in matters it previously could not and because it potentially changed interpre-
tation of Article 51 of U.N. Charter in manner that would make U.S. action illegal).
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necessary information. 189  Second, the ICJ has altered the re-
quirements of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, and held against a
State taking defensive measures against non-State sponsored ter-
rorists.190 This Note will now discuss the impact of these inter-
pretations regarding the War on Terror.
A. Jurisdiction
If the General Assembly decided to challenge U.S. action
during Operation Enduring Freedom in an advisory proceeding,
the ICJ would be able to hear the case and address the policy
decisions of the United States.19' Challenging Operation Endur-
ing Freedom would raise many of the same issues that came up
during the Construction of a Wall Case.192 One issue is whether
the ICJ should answer requests made by the General Assembly to
bypass the principle that a State must consent before its disputes
are brought before the ICJ.19 Further, the General Assembly
should not request an advisory opinion so that it may later exer-
cise its powers over the dispute based on the opinion. 94 Al-
though the United States would most likely not consent to pro-
ceedings regarding its policy, the ruling in the Construction of a
Wall Case opened the door for the ICJ to address the policy de-
terminations of States so long as the General Assembly or Secur-
189. See supra notes 98-143 and accompanying text (explaining how recent deci-
sion not to exercise discretion in finding jurisdiction in Construction of a Wall Case
changed interpretation of principles ofjudicial propriety).
190. See supra notes 144-87 and accompanying text (reviewing different interpreta-
tions of requirements of Article 51 of U.N. Charter and stance that ICJ took in Construc-
tion of a Wall Case).
191. See supra notes 7-10, 104 and accompanying text (stating that ICJ found that it
had jurisdiction to hear Construction of a Wall Case even though Israel did not consent
and many challenged decision arguing that it was bilateral in nature because United
Nations had become involved in matter and observing that United Nations has acted to
fight against international terrorism).
192. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text (observing that decisions to
build separation barrier and to begin Operation Enduring Freedom were similar be-
cause both were aimed at terminating threats posed by international terrorist organiza-
tions not sponsored by individual States).
193. See supra notes 115-20 and accompanying text (noting that in Western Sahara
Case, ICJ reiterated principle that exercising jurisdiction may be improper when con-
sent is not given if it bypasses principle that States are not required to have their dis-
putes settled by ICJ).
194. See supra notes 121-24 and accompanying text (remarking that in Western Sa-
hara Case, ICJ stated that request would be improper if General Assembly sought advi-
sory opinion so that it could later exercise powers over matter but that in Construction of
a Wall Case, ICJ overturned this principle).
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ity Council had issued resolutions regarding the matter. 195
The decision to hear the case, however, would further jeop-
ardize the ICJ's relationship with the United States, and with
other Nations. t96 If the standards for judicial review set out in
the Construction of a Wall Case are applied again, the new holding
would indicate that the standards of that case could not be ex-
plained by the politically charged subject matter of the case.19 7
Instead, it would represent the most recent elucidation of judi-
cial propriety. 198 The principle of consent was one of the pri-
mary protections guaranteed in the Charter of the ICJ. 9 9 Addi-
tionally, allowing policy determinations to be reviewed before
the ICJ allows all States to become involved in the decisions of
another State because liberal submissions by non-parties are per-
mitted during advisory proceedings. 20 0  This has the affect of
turning the ICJ into an actor on a political stage.2 0'
B. Analysis of the Article 51 Defense
If the ICJ does apply its jurisprudence from the Construction
of a Wall Case and decides that it has jurisdiction, it should de-
cline to apply the standard of review for Article 51 that it elabo-
195. See supra notes 119-20, 131-32 and accompanying text (noting that ICJ found
that lack of consent and bilateral nature of dispute did not make controversy in Con-
struction of a Wall Case outside of judicial character of ICJ because United Nations had
become involved in issue).
196. See supra notes 21, 101 and accompanying text (arguing that decision to hear
Construction of a Wall Case jeopardized relationship of ICJ with States because it allows
ICJ to rule on policy determinations of States and because principle of consent, which is
no longer necessary, is one cornerstone of international adjudication).
197. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (maintaining that dispotif in Con-
struction of a Wall Case was political manifesto that expressed opinions ofJudges, demon-
strated by fact that Judges called for creation of two separate States and for negotiated
peace).
198. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (observing that ICJ announced new
principles of judicial propriety in Construction of a Wall Case).
199. See supra note 101, 140 and accompanying text (stating that consent is one of
principle protections provided by Charter of ICJ).
200. See supra note 21 139, 140, 163 and accompanying text (observing that one
consequence of permitting advisory proceedings is that all States can submit written
and oral arguments, allowing them to become involved in judging another State's pol-
icy determinations).
201. See supra note 140 and accompanying text (noting that commentators and
several Member States of United Nations believed that decision to exercise jurisdiction
in Construction of a Wall Case inappropriately politicized ICJ and made it executive
agency of General Assembly because issued dispotif expressed political stance of ICJ
which operates as judicial organ of United Nations).
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rated in that case.2 °2 In the Construction of a Wall Case, the ICJ
did not address the implications of Security Council Resolutions
1368 and 1373.203 It distinguished the situation contemplated in
those resolutions from than that presented in the Construction of
a Wall Case, and thus found it irrelevant to Israel's claim that it
built its separation barrier in the exercise of a legitimate right of
self-defense. 20 4 Because those resolutions do apply to the fight
against international terrorism, the ICJ should apply the tradi-
tional Article 51 analysis to determine if the justification of self-
defense applies to the use of force in Operation Enduring Free-
dom.
2 05
Article 51 does not articulate what constitutes an armed at-
tack. 20 6 Yet, international support for Operation Enduring Free-
dom indicates that the September 1 1th attacks constituted an
armed attack as understood by international customary law. 20 7
Furthermore, the series of attacks perpetrated by al Qaeda
against the United States were one of the gravest uses of force
because they were aimed at innocent civilians, a requirement ar-
ticulated in the Nicaragua Case and the Oil Platforms Case.20 ' The
U.N. Charter is not explicit in requiring that an armed attack
202. See supra note 172 and accompanying text (explaining that in Construction of a
Wall Case, ICJ interpreted Article 51 of U.N. Charter to require that armed attack be
attributed to State in order for another State to act in self-defense).
203. See supra note 172 and accompanying text (remarking that Resolutions 1368
and 1373 recognized new right of self-defense that was not addressed by majority in
Construction of a Wall Case and that implications of ignoring these resolutions has yet to
be determined).
204. See supra note 172 and accompanying text (noting that ICJ found that Resolu-
tions 1368 and 1373 were not relevant because attacks came from area controlled by
Israel, whereas September 11th attacks, which gave rise to resolutions, originated from
area not in control of United States, and thus could not be applied to matter between
Israel and Palestine).
205. See supra notes 185-87 and accompanying text (concluding that because Reso-
lutions 1368 and 1373 do apply to international war on terrorism, ICJ should not apply
precedent of Construction of a Wall Case if it reviews decision of United States).
206. See supra note 147 and accompanying text (discussing that U.N. Charter does
not articulate the requirements of armed attack).
207. See supra notes 156-57 and accompanying text (concluding that ICJ stated, in
Oil Platforms Case, that for use of self-defense to be justified by international law, force
had to be in response to armed attack within meaning of Article 51 of U.N. Charter and
as understood by international customary law and that international acceptance of Op-
eration Enduring Freedom indicates that international community accepted that use of
force was in accordance with international customary law).
208. See supra note 161 and accompanying text (maintaining that while ICJ has
stated that use of force against one State must constitute grave use of force in order for
use of force in self-defense to be justified, September 11th attacks and series of those
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must be attributed to a State,2 °9 it is flexible enough to adapt to
the changing nature of war, and it must do so in order to main-
tain international peace and security.2 " Additionally, the U.N.
Security Council adopted Resolutions 1368 and 1373 that recog-
nized both the right to self-defense and the threat posed by in-
ternational terrorism, indicating that the Security Council recog-
nized the legitimacy of the use of force against terrorist organiza-
tions.2 ' International cooperation during Operation Enduring
Freedom demonstrates that the international community now
deems it appropriate to use military force against non-State ac-
tors in the face of the threats posed by international terrorism.212
The idea that Article 51 of the U.N. Charter does not apply to
terrorist attacks has been outpaced by modern warfare, and the
potential State sponsorship of terrorist activity against its ene-
213mies.
Operation Enduring Freedom was necessary in light of the
threat posed by al Qaeda. 4 Because terrorist organizations
such as al Qaeda demonstrate a disregard for rules of interna-
tional law and for accepted moral codes, it is nearly impossible
perpetrated by al Qaeda constitute such grave use of force because of large toll on
personal property and civilian lives).
209. See supra note 168 and accompanying text (observing that nothing in text of
Article 51 of U.N. Charter requires that attack be attributed to another State in order
for use of self-defense to be justified by U.N. Charter).
210. See supra notes 1, 169, 187 and accompanying text (concluding that U.N.
Charter, and particularly Article 51 of U.N. Charter, is broad enough to adapt to chang-
ing nature of modern warfare and that existing framework should be used to regulate
and judge all new threats posed).
211. See supra note 187 and accompanying text (finding that Security Council rec-
ognized that U.N. Charter is flexible enough to incorporate modern acts of warfare by
linking threat posed by international terrorism as defined by Resolution 1269 to right
of self-defense under Article 51 of U.N. Charter in Security Council Resolutions 1368
and 1373).
212. See supra notes 156, 175, and 181 and accompanying text (noting that interna-
tional custom is evidence of international law and that that international community
has accepted that use of force during Operation Enduring Freedom fits within parame-
ters of Article 51 of U.N. Charter, indicating that ICJ should not find that action of
United States during Operation Enduring Freedom was contrary to international law).
213. See supra notes 1, 176 and accompanying text (explaining that international
community has become more aware of threats posed by international terrorism and
U.N. Charter is flexible enough to address new threats posed by modern warfare and
that ICJ should use existing framework that has been accepted by international commu-
nity to address new threats posed instead of adopting new definitions which may not be
accepted by community).
214. See supra note 162 and accompanying text (observing that for use of force to
be lawful, it must be necessary response to threat posed).
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to determine the extent of the threat posed by terrorist organiza-
215 A a a eiso taktions. Al Qaeda has launched a series of attacks against the
United States.2 16 The September 11th attacks prove that inno-
cent civilians are a major target of the terrorists. 217 While the
United States may not have been responding to an immediate,
specific threat posed by al Qaeda, the history of attacks clearly
justified the belief that the United States had to take forceful
action to prevent additional strikes against its citizens.218
Finally, the attacks were proportional to the threat posed to
the United States. 219 The September 11th attacks demonstrated
the ability of terrorist organizations to coordinate large scale at-
tacks that cause massive casualties. 220 They indicated the disre-
gard for innocent civilian life and the willingness to sacrifice the
lives of members to complete the mission.221 Furthermore, the
doctrine of al Qaeda and the rhetoric of its leaders indicate that
its mission will not be accomplished until all U.S. citizens and
others obstructing the goals of the organization have been
215. See supra notes 3, 60-61 and accompanying text(noting that terrorist groups
do not uphold same standards as States and often target civilians and violate other
principles of international law, and that al Qaeda has perpetrated series of attacks
against United States and proclaimed that its work will not be done until United States
surrenders or is destroyed).
216. See supra note 60 and accompanying text (describing series of attacks against
U.S. military and civilian targets that were orchestrated by al Qaeda).
217. See supra notes 13, 61-68, 161 and accompanying text (concluding that Sep-
tember llth attacks were final in series of attacks against United States and were
targeted at civilians and demonstrated enormity of capabilities of terrorist organizations
in completing their mission of fighting against all U.S. citizens until United States sur-
renders or is destroyed).
218. See supra notes 60-68, 160-61, 163 and accompanying text (finding that previ-
ously, international community has not accepted legitimacy of use of force against se-
ries of terrorist attacks, international support for Operation Enduring Freedom indi-
cates that series of attacks were grave enough and posed serious enough threat to justify
use of force against al Qaeda to protect citizens from future attacks).
219. See supra note 162 and accompanying text (stating that ICJ has held that State
must prove its actions are proportional to threat posed to it in order to justify its use of
force with Article 51 of U.N. Charter).
220. See supra note 161 and accompanying text (remarking that September 11th
attacks reached a magnitude that had never been reached before and demonstrated
ability of al Qaeda to orchestrate assaults that could cause massive casualties of both life
and property).
221. See supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text (stating that one of objectives of
al Qaeda is to kill Americans and allies and, following September 11th, organization
praised those who orchestrated attacks against United States and urged others to con-
tinue with organization's mission).
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killed.2 2 Because of the gravity of threats posed by organiza-
tions such as al Qaeda, which have demonstrated a disregard for
moral codes and the value of life, and potentially have access to
weapons of mass destruction, it is difficult to conceive of an op-
eration that would not be in proportion to the threat posed.223
CONCLUSION
The ICJ holding in the Construction of a Wall Case under-
mined the prestige and credibility of the ICJ in the international
community and made the world safer for terrorists and more
dangerous for citizens of countries who abide by international
law. The opinion in the Construction of a Wall Case was more a
political manifesto than a judicial ruling, which represented the
preconceived opinions of the United Nations regarding the Is-
raeli-Palestinian conflict. The opinion in the Construction of the
Wall Case should be viewed in light of the long and bloody his-
tory of the underlying conflict and should be tenuously applied
to future questions before the ICJ in order to maintain the
proper roles of the ICJ and of self-defense in international af-
fairs. While negotiating a peace in the Middle East is crucial for
the safety of countless citizens, allowing States to protect their
citizens is an essential goal.
The ICJ should, as Article 38 of its Statute commands, look
at the international consensus regarding the threat posed by ter-
rorism and the legitimacy of using force in self-defense against
the atrocious acts of international terrorists in making any future
determinations regarding the applicability of Article 51 of the
U.N. Charter. Terrorists demonstrate a disregard for rules of in-
ternational law and for accepted moral codes. The growing
strength of religious-based terrorism presents a threat that was
not contemplated at the time the U.N. Charter was drafted.
The September 11 th attacks demonstrate the capabilities of
these organizations to orchestrate large scale attacks that cause
massive casualties and immeasurable damage to property. For
years, the international community has embraced the idea that
222. See supra notes 61-68 (observing that mission of al Qaeda includes destroying
all Americans and all those who stand in way of completing their mission).
223. See supra notes 1-4, 61-68, 163 and accompanying text (concluding that new,
grave threat posed by international terrorism requires States to respond to threats
posed by groups who do not abide by moral codes, may have access to newer, more
deadly weapons, and believe that ultimate sacrifice to be made is their own life).
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targeting civilians violates principles of international law; how-
ever, terrorist organizations have adopted it as part of their pol-
icy. Ruling that actions against these reprehensible organiza-
tions violate international law allows these groups to find new
ways to perpetrate even deadlier attacks against those who up-
hold the law, and makes innocent individuals less able to rely on
their governments to provide protection.
